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DISABILITY AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
THE CASE AGAINST "INCLUSION"
Anne Proffitt Dupre*
Abstract. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires states that wish
to qualify for federal assistance to demonstrate that they have a policy ensuring all children
with disabilities the right to a "free appropriate public education." IDEA also requires that
disabled children be educated with nondisabled children "to the maximum extent
appropriate." This Article focuses on the tension between IDEA's mandates for appropriate
education and integration to the maximum extent appropriate. Advocates of full inclusion
claim that, under IDEA, all disabled children-regardless of characteristics-must be placed
in the general education classroom for the entire day. Many courts have tacitly accepted some
of the premises of full inclusion advocates. In fact, some courts have strongly suggested that
the purported social benefits of inclusion can be more important than either the academic
achievement of the disabled child or the cost to the learning environment in the general
classroom. This Article explains how the courts have erred in their analyses of the statute, and
illustrates how some of the critiques that have been set forth in the education literature relate
to the inclusion inquiry. The Article then discusses the critique of the racial integration model,
a point of view that has been largely ignored by full inclusion advocates and the courts that
have accepted their premises. Finally, the Article contends that in a community of learning
such as the public school classroom, the primary objective must be to impart a serious
education to all students.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 776
II. THE ROAD FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION ......... 783
A. The History of Exclusion .............................................. 783
B. The Statutory Response ................................................ 785
C. The Inclusion Movement .............................................. 791
D. The Jurisprudence ofInclusion: Chaos in
the Circuits ................................................................... 794
1. Promoting "Appropriate" Integration Over
"Appropriate " Education ...................................... 797
2. Promoting "Appropriate" Education Over
"Appropriate" Integration .................................... 804
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank John
Dayton, William Dupre, Thomas Eaton, Steven Freidland, Marci Hamilton, Edward Larson, Martha
Matthews, Richard Nagareda, Michael Wells, and Rebecca White for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article, and Kelly Casey and Katherine Hung for their valuable research
assistance. The author was employed as a public school teacher before entering law school. A grant
from the University of Georgia School of Law provided financial support for this Article.
Washington Law Review
III. THE CORNERSTONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT ...................... 806
A. "A Free Appropriate Public Education" .................... 807
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's View ................................... 813
IV. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNDERLIE THE
INCLUSION MOVEMENT ............................................... 817
A. Assessing the Curative Value of Inclusion ................... 818
1. Stigma and Self-Esteem ......................................... 818
2. M odeling ............................................................... 826
B. After Forty Years: The Curative Value and Racial
Integration .................................................................... 829
V. THE COMMUNITY OF LEARNING AND THE COST
OF INCLUSION ................................................................. 842
A. The Effect on the Academic Achievement of
Nondisabled Students ................................................... 843
1. D isruption ............................................................. 845
2. Teacher Attention .................................................. 848
B. Supplementary Aids and Services ................................. 854
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 857
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has created two categories of students in the public
schools-those who are entitled under federal statute to receive a free
appropriate education in the least restrictive environment and those who
are not. When Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975, one educator predicted that the statute
would "change the American public school system more drastically than
the 1954 Supreme Court ruling on desegregation."'2 The statute, now
1. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1,161 (1976)).
2. National Sch. Pub. Relations Ass'n, Educating All the Handicapped 61 (L977) (quoting Careth
Ellingson, educator, and referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 48';, 493 (1954)). When
President Ford signed EAHCA into law he stated, "Unfortunately, this bill promises more than the
federal government can deliver, and its good intentions could be thwarted by the many unwise
provisions it contains." Id. at 6. But see Mark C. Weber, The Transformation ofthe Education of the
Handicapped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 349, 435-
36 nA00 (1990) (claiming that although EAHCA is "radical" statute that called for major shift in
resources, it does not threaten balance of economic power as did Wagner Act, nor does it threaten
balance of economic and electoral power as did Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts).
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called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),3 has
indeed had a profound effect on the public schools. Without a doubt,
many of the changes resulting from the passage of IDEA have been
beneficial to disabled and nondisabled students alike. When Congress
passed this legislation in 1975, there was a legitimate and serious
concern that many students with special needs had been denied the
opportunity for education in many of the nation's public schools.'
Congress thus required any state that wished to qualify for federal special
education financial assistance to demonstrate that it had a policy in effect
that "assures all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate
public education."5 This Article does not question either the legitimacy
of those concerns or the sincerity of the legislation passed to correct the
problem. It does question, however, as do a number of educators and
researchers, both the direct and indirect costs of complying with
Congress's mandate.
One cost of IDEA is the financial obligation it has placed on local
school districts.6 In the years since IDEA was passed, local public school
districts have struggled to allocate the scarce dollar resources available
for classroom instruction to meet the needs of disabled students who
have the statutory right to a free appropriate education, without depriving
nondisabled students who lack this federal guarantee.7 But as spending
on special education has soared, spending on general education has not
kept pace.' For example, one city reported that providing aides and
therapists for special education students resulted in a $25,000 annual per-
3. Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491
(1994)). Many cases discussed herein were decided under EAHCA. Nevertheless, EAHCA "remains
the foundation for IDEA," and those cases are still guiding precedent for interpretations of issues in
IDEA. Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 150 n.1 (2d Cir. 1992). In this Article, the statute is referred
to as IDEA or the Act. Congress recently amended IDEA. See Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq.). Because the amendments were passed after the completion of this Article, they are
not discussed herein.
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(bX3) (finding that "more than half of the children with disabilities in the
United States do not receive appropriate educational services. . .
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
6. See, e.g., Richard Whitmire, Special Ed: Is the Price Too High?, USA Today, June 17, 1996, at
6D (revealing soaring cost of special education). The federal government was to have paid 40% of
the special education budget, but pays only six percent. Id.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
8. Whitmire, supra note 6 (reporting study of Council for Educational Development). In 1993,
per-pupil costs for special education were 2.3 times the cost of regular education. Stephen Chaikind
et al., What Do We Know About the Cost of Special Education? A Selected Review, 26 J. Special
Educ. 344,345 (1993).
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pupil expenditure for disabled students, while the annual per-pupil
expenditure for general education students was $561 . Indeed, the
federal courts determined that IDEA required taxpayers in the school
district where I live-Clarke County, Georgia-to pay the tuition of one
autistic boy who was sent to a private school in Japan to obtain an
"appropriate" education."0 The cost to taxpayers also may include the
cost of family trips to visit the child." Even those students who are
expelled from school for severe behavior unrelated to their disabilities
may be entitled to continue receiving educational sen,ices such as a
home tutor at the taxpayer's expense. 2 The costs to schools as they
attempt to comply with IDEA-including the litigation costs from
lawsuits by parents challenging the school's treatment of their child-
can be daunting. 3
9. Whitmire, supra note 6 (referring to Dayton, Ohio); see also Sam Dillon, Special Education
Absorbs School Resources, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1994, at B5 (explaining thlt in New York City,
average annual cost per special education child is $19,208, whereas average annual cost per child is
$6394).
10. Drew P. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1989). The "autistic and
severely mentally retarded" boy sued the school district through his parents and next friends and was
awarded "$42,637.00, representing tuition, school fees and uniform fees paid [by his parents] for
[his] placement in the residential facilities in Tokyo and Boston." Id. at 928-29. The average per-
pupil expenditures on public school students in Georgia in 1992-93 was $46:36. See U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Digest of Educ. Statistics 1, 174 tbl.164 (1995). The average per-pupil expenditure in the
United States in the same time period was $5594. Id. See generally Cleveng-r v. Oak Ridge Sch.
Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984) (determining $88,000 per year program was only program
appropriate for child); T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp. 420 (D.N.J. 1983) (requiring school
district to pay for psychotherapy services for one child totaling over $25,000); 60 Minutes: Special
Education-Moneys Spent on Special Education Students Funds Are Decreased (CBS television
broadcast, June 9, 1996) (recounting that severely disabled boy was sent to special private school at
cost of $100,000 per year).
11. Sam Allis, The Struggle to Pay for Special Ed, Time, Nov. 4, 1996, at 82 (discussing how
annual cost to school district of sending autistic South Dakota boy to private school in
Connecticut-including eight trips per year for his family to visit him-reached $125,000 per year,
one quarter of 80% increase in school budget accounted for boy's special education needs, causing
55% increase in property taxes).
12. Thomas F. Guernsey & Kathe Klare, Special Education Law 138-39 (1993) (noting that
courts are split as to whether obligation exists to provide alternative educational programming during
disciplinary suspension). But see Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997). The court
stated:
[IDEA does not] condition the receipt of IDEA funding on the continued provision of
educational services to disabled students who are expelled or suspended long-term due to
serious misconduct wholly unrelated to their disabilities, and the United States Department of
Education was without authority to condition the Commonwealth of Virginia's receipt of IDEA
funding on the continued provision of free education to such students.
Id.
13. A study of trends in education law reveals that lawsuits charging discrimination against
special education students are on the rise. See generally Robert Hanley, A Test Case for Special
Disability and the Public Schools
Apart from matters of financial cost, much discussion has focused on
the effect of IDEA upon the placement of disabled students. The most
hotly debated issue among educators today-an issue that has bewildered
both the schools and the courts-is IDEA's requirement that disabled
children must be educated with nondisabled students "to the maximum
extent appropriate." 4 This statutory requirement resulted, first, in a push
for "mainstreaming." Under this model, a disabled child's primary
placement is in a separate special education class, but the child is
"mainstreamed" in a general education class for part of the day.'5 The
mainstreaming concept has changed into what is now termed
"inclusion."' 6 Under the inclusion model, the disabled child is placed in
the general education classroom for the entire day. 7 In the early 1980s,
the concept of inclusion took on a life of its own as advocates of "full
inclusion" argued that all disabled children-regardless of
characteristics-must be placed in the general education classroom "for
all of the school day in every school setting, preschool through high
Education Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1996, at A18. Moreover, at least one court has held that, in
addition to the attorneys fees allowed by the statute, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1994), a school
district that violates the rights of students with disabilities may be liable for compensatory damages.
See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484,495 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Hanley, supra (describing case where
court awarded $15,000 in damages against teacher of disabled child who gave child written test
although child was entitled to oral test).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994). See Dixie S. Huefher, The Mainstreaming Cases: Tensions
and Trends for School Administrators, 30 Educ. Admin. Q. 27 (1994) (stating that of all legal issues
arising out of IDEA, "none is thornier" than issue of when disabled child must be placed in regular
education classroom); Daniel H. Melvin, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44
DePaul L. Rev. 599, 601 (1995) (noting "intense national debate" about inclusion); cf. Michael A.
Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Education Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New
Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & Educ. 523, 549 (1996) (calling inclusion "the most unsettled and
unsettling [legal] issue") (quoting Elena M Gallagos, Beyond Board of Educ. v. Rowley:
Educational Benefit for the Handicapped?, 97 Am. J. Educ. 258, 283 (1989)); Albert Shanker,
Inclusion and Ideology, 24 Exceptional Parent, Sept. 1994, at 39 (stating that "rush towards full
inclusion" is likely to have "most profound-and most destructive-effect" on American education).
15. Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom.
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
16. Although some courts continue to use the term "mainstreaming," this term is not generally
favored by educators and has been virtually replaced by the term "inclusion." See, e.g., Mavis v.
Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 971 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting preference in some educational circles for
use of term "inclusion" instead of "mainstreaming"); see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 14, at
525 (noting evolution of full inclusion). For consistency's sake, this Article uses the term
"inclusion."
17. Carol A. Kochar & Lynda L. West, Handbookfor Successful Inclusion 4 (1996) (pointing out
that although inclusion is defined in many ways by many organizations and individuals, it generally
refers to "maximum integration of students with disabilities into general classrooms or the increase
in numbers and proportions of students who receive special services while attending general
education classes") (citations omitted).
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school." 8 Supporters of the full inclusion movement claim that
separating disabled children by placing them in special education
classrooms stigmatizes and deprives disabled students of appropriate
nondisabled models.' 9 These advocates compare the movement to
include disabled students in the general education classroom to the
movement for racial integration in the public schools.20
To address the placement of disabled students, IDEA sets forth
affirmative substantive rights and detailed procedural rights.2' In
particular, IDEA allows parents who want their disabled child to be
included to bring a lawsuit in federal or state court if school officials
refuse to place the child in a general classroom for the entire school
day.2 The courts that have addressed the issue, primarily the federal
circuit courts of appeals, have established a number of divergent tests to
determine whether the statutory requirement of IDEA--to educate the
disabled child with children who are not disabled to the maximum extent
appropriate-has been met.' In developing these tests, some courts have
tacitly accepted the premises of the full inclusion advocates and have
suggested that the purported social benefits of inclusion can be more
important than either the academic achievement of the disabled child or
18. James McLeskey & Nancy Waldron, Responses to Questions Teachers and Administrators
Frequently Ask About Inclusive School Programs, 78 Phi Delta Kappan 150, 152 (1996); see
Claudine Sherrill, Least Restrictive Environment and Total Inclusion Philosophies: Critical
Analysis, Palaestra, Spring 1994, at 25, 28 (noting that meaning of inclusion has broadened from
early usage as specific placement or option to "independent status as a separate philosophy"); see
also Janice M. Baker & Naomi Zigmond, The Meaning and Practice of Inclusion for Students with
Learning Disabilities: Themes from the Five Cases, 29 J. Special Educ. 163 (1995) (noting that
focus for students with learning disabilities has "shifted from an emphasis on what and how to teach
to an emphasis on where to teach"); Betty A. Hallenbeck & James Kauffman, How Does
Observational Learning Affect the Behavior of Students with Emotional or Behavior Disorders?, 29
J. Special Educ. 45 (1995) ("Special education reformers suggest that all students with disabilities-
including those with emotional or behavioral disorders-should be placed in their neighborhood
schools and in regular classes."). Not all advocates for the disabled support the full inclusion
movement. See, e.g., Huefher, supra note 14, at 48-49 (noting that ARC (fornerly Association for
Retarded Citizens) has "been outspoken in support of full inclusion" but that Learning Disabilities
Association of America and some educators of the deaf do not support full inclusion movement).
19. See, e.g., Huefuer, supra note 14, at 49 (citing language modeling and social interaction as
primary reasons for inclusion).
20. See, e.g., Daniel D. Sage & Leonard C. Burrello, Policy and Management in Special
Education 39 (1986) (asserting that principles established in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), are applicable to "other discriminatory classifications," including classification of disabled);
Weber, supra note 2, at 393 (noting "powerful analogy" to race cases).
21. See infra Part ll.B.
22. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II.D for an examination of the tests that have been developed by the circuit
courts.
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the cost to the learning environment in the general classroom.24 This
Article questions that conclusion and the assumptions upon which it is
based.
Ensuring that our nation's citizens obtain a "serious education"'  is at
the core of the constitutional project.26 Citizens must be educated so they
can recognize, appreciate, and preserve the individual constitutional
rights that are guaranteed to them.27 Education is "the very foundation of
good citizenship."28 Students must first obtain a serious education so that
when they are adults they will be able to participate knowledgeably in
democratic institutions.29 Obtaining a serious education, then, is perhaps
the essential prerequisite to liberty. It involves hard work, and it
requires discipline of self and discipline of others, so that an environment
will exist where serious learning can take place.3' The position taken by
24. See infra Part Il.D.1.
25. Anne P. Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public
Schools, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49, 98 (1996) (defining "serious education"); see also infra notes
206-13, 396 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("Indeed, the Constitution presupposes the existence of an informed
citizenry prepared to participate in governmental affairs...."); J. Tussman, Government and the
Mind 54 (1977) (describing "teaching power" as inherent constitutional authority of state to establish
and direct teaching activity and institutions needed to ensure continuity and further legitimate,
general, and special purposes).
27. "[If free speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must have something worth saying, together
with the maturity and the skill needed to say it." Dupre, supra note 25, at 97 (quoting Bruce C.
Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating
Structures, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 663, 666 (1987)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
(noting "pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage"); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (recognizing role of public schools in "inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system").
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). As Professor Suzanna Sherry has stated,
"[A] republican citizen needs an education that will enable her to exercise both the tights and
responsibilities of citizenship." Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 132 (1995).
29. See Dupre, supra note 25, at 97-98 (writing that without serious education, citizen is left
without necessary tools to challenge both government tyranny and tyranny of demagogues); see also
Sherry, supra note 28, at 132 ("[E]ducation is necessary to the thoughtful or responsible exercise of
citizenship tights."); cf. John Dayton & Carl Glickman, American Constitutional Democracy:
Implications for Public School Curriculum Development, 69 Peabody J. Educ. 62, 63 (1994)
(pointing out irony that public schools are facing challenges to their very existence at time when
cohesive bond of school---"[the] vital public institution necessary to the perpetuation of a free and
democratic nation"--is most needed).
30. See Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1697
(1990) ("The extent to which we take the commitment to democracy seriously is measured by the
extent to which we take the commitment to education seriously.').
31. Dupre, supra note 25, at 98.
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many of the courts that have addressed inclusion--that academic
progress is less important than academic placement-does not allow
schools to create an environment where serious learning will consistently
occur for either the disabled or the nondisabled child. It is this erosion of
the community of learning-for the disabled and nondisabled alike-that
is the focus of this Article.
Part II provides an overview of the legal history of education for
disabled children, describes the federal statutory scherae for students
with disabilities, traces the development of the inclusion movement, and
describes the judicial responses. Part III argues that the courts have erred
in elevating inclusion over academic progress. Contrary to the suggestion
by some courts of appeals, IDEA itself recognizes that educational
progress for the disabled child is more important than educational
placement. To claim otherwise defeats the primary mission of the public
schools-the academic training of students-which includes preparing
the young for life as adults "in our increasingly complex society and for
the duties of citizenship in our democratic Republic."32 For the disabled
child in particular, education and training may make the difference
between a life of dependency and a life as a productive citizen.
Part IV unravels the premise that underlies the inclusion crusade. The
inclusion movement, often compared to the civil rights movement for
racial equality, is founded on the belief that separating children because
of difference causes harm, a harm that can be cured only by exposure to
other children who are of the mainstream.3 To illustrate the potential
perniciousness of this premise, Part IV examines inclusi.on through the
lens of a theory set forth by some scholars and commentators-a critique
that has been largely ignored by disability inclusion advocates and the
courts that have accepted their premises. 4 These scholars claim that the
premises upon which the racial integration model is based-the same
premises upon which the inclusion model is based-are seriously flawed
and that they have been harmful to African American students.
Examining the premises that sustain the disability inclusion movement
through the prism presented by these critiques adds a new perspective to
the inclusion debate.
Part V addresses the direct and indirect costs of inclusion to the
community of learning in the regular classroom. Specifically, Part V
32. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
34. My focus here is on the political and social claim by some scholars that the civil rights
movement failed to improve the status of Afican Americans in significant measure.
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addresses the possibility that inclusion of a disabled child may interfere
with the academic achievement of nondisabled students by disrupting
classroom activities, by distracting other students from the task at hand,
or by requiring a disproportionate amount of the teacher's time and
energy. This Part concludes that many courts have set a standard for
inclusion that would allow too much interference with the learning
process of the nondisabled child. Finally, Part V reveals how the courts
have failed to consider how the aggregate direct economic costs in
resources, including the aids and services required to implement
inclusion, will affect the academic educational enterprise for all students.
The Article ultimately concludes that the courts that have uncritically,
albeit tacitly, accepted some of the premises of the full inclusionists
should reconsider their position and refocus attention on the academic
mission of the public schools. IDEA calls for a rational consideration of
placement decisions on a case-by-case basis. "Full inclusion" is not
required by IDEA.35 In fact, full inclusion most likely violates IDEA
because it fails to give each disabled child an educational program that
meets his or her unique needs, thus depriving the child of the free
appropriate public education that the statute requires. Under the terms of
the statute, courts can and should elevate academic achievement over
academic setting. In addition, Congress should revisit IDEA to make
explicit what a logical reading of the statute already assumes: that no
student-disabled or nondisabled-may interfere with another student's
opportunity to obtain an appropriate education or inhibit the progress of
the collective education enterprise.
II. THE ROAD FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION
A. The History of Exclusion'
Educating the disabled in the public schools was considered a matter
of little importance until the latter half of the twentieth century. 6 A
number of state statutes permitted public schools to exclude disabled
children altogether if school officials determined that the child would not
benefit from public education or would disrupt the classroom. 7 In one
35. See supra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
36. See generally Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen B. Coriell, Traversing the Sisyphean Trails of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act: An Overview, 18 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 571, 571-74
(1992) (describing history of special education).
37. See generally Richard C. Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped
Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 Ohio St. L.J. 349, 351 (1975) (discussing
Washington Law Review
state, if a school official had excluded a disabled child, parents who
nonetheless insisted that the child attend school could be held criminally
liable.3"
Attitudes began to change in the second half of the twentieth century.
New powerful antibiotics that became available for public use in the
early 1950s helped control infection after surgical treatment.39
Consequently, more children with severe disabilities survived early
childhood.4" As the population of the severely disabled icreased, so did
the need for social services.4 The most common service option for the
severely disabled at that time was institutionalization.42
During the 1960s, however, advocates for the disabled-with the civil
rights movement for racial minorities as their guide-argued that the
disabled, too, were a minority group that faced discrimination.43
Following the lead of the racial civil rights movement, advocates for the
disabled began the battle for civil rights in the federal courts. Again, like
the racial civil rights movement, one of the first shots was fired at the
school house.
Two landmark decisions, Pennsylvania Ass "nfor Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth' (PARC) and Mills v. Board of Education,45 set the stage
for the federal statute establishing the right to a free and appropriate
education to children with disabilities. PARC, although a consent order,
generally is considered the first "right to education case" regarding the
disabled.46 An association advocating rights for the disabled sued
statutes); Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's Perspective
and Proposal For Change, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 331,343 n.40 (1994) (citing statutes).
38. Act of May 18, 1965, ch. 584, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 641 (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115-
165 (1963)); see also Karen Sindelar, How and Why the Law Has Failed: An Historical Analysis of
Services for the Retarded in North Carolina and a Prescription for Change, 48 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Spring 1985, at 125.
The courts were no more sympathetic. Examples of court indifference include one early decision
that upheld the expulsion of a child who was disruptive "either voluntarily or by reason of
imbecility." Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1893). Ancther court determined
that laws requiring compulsory education and setting up programs for "hand.capped children" did
not mandate the public education of a child who was mentally impaired. Department of Pub.
Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265 (Il1. 1958).
39. Carole Murray-Seegert, Nasty Girls, Thugs, and Humans Like Us 17 (1939).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 21.
44. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
45. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
46. Mark G. Yudofet al., Educational Policy and the Law 718 (1992).
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Pennsylvania on behalf of mentally retarded children who had been
excluded from the state's public schools, assigned to inappropriate
special education programs, or assigned to programs of questionable
merit. The consent order required Pennsylvania to provide:
a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity, within the context of a presumption that, among
the alternative programs of education and training required by
statute to be available, placement in regular public school class is
preferable to placement in a special public school class and
placement in a special public school class is preferable to
placement in any other type of program of education and training.47
The Mills court dealt with a class of students broader than that in
PARC. The class included not only retarded children, but all disabled
children excluded from public education. The Mills court determined that
the Board of Education had violated the due process rights of disabled
children by denying them a publicly supported education.48 The court-
ordered that no child eligible for public education be excluded from
regular public school assignment by rule, policy, or practice unless
provided with "adequate alternative educational services suited to the
child's needs" and with "a constitutionally adequate prior hearing."'9
The decisions in PARC and Mills "spawned substantial popular and
scholarly attention and similar lawsuits in more than thirty states."5
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
B. The Statutory Response
The two federal statutory provisions that most affect the rights in
education of children with disabilities are Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 19735' and the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA), passed in 1975.52 EAHCA is now part of the
47. Pennsylvania Ass'nfor Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
48. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
49. Id. at 878.
50. Yudofet al., supra note 46, at 719.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 794(1994).
52. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 3 Section 504
prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all
programs receiving federal financial assistance.' Although Section 504's
broad prohibition against discrimination includes public schools, it is not
as detailed as IDEA, which specifies affirmative substantive and
procedural rights for disabled children. In addition to the! public school's
duty to assure a free appropriate education, IDEA also :requires that the
disabled child be educated "to the maximum extent appropriate" with
"children who are not disabled."'5 It is this provision in IDEA on which
the inclusion movement and the judicial decisions have focused.
The cornerstone of the IDEA is its substantive requirement that to
qualify for federal special education financial assistance under the Act, a
state .must demonstrate that it has a policy in effect that "assures all
children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public
education."'56 States must set forth a plan that has as its goal "full
educational opportunity"'  for disabled children. Schools must
implement this plan by developing an "individualized educational
program" (IEP) for each disabled child that contains instruction specially
crafted to meet the unique needs of the child." As interpreted by the
53. Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491
(1994)).
54. "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." 29 U.S.C. § 794.
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). Although section 504 does not have statutory language like that of
IDEA, section 504 regulations require recipients of federal funds to educate children with disabilities
with children without disabilities "to the maximum extent possible." 34 C.F.R § 104.34 (1996). The
IDEA regulations are found at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556 (1996).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (emphasis added); see also Daniel RLR v. State Eld. of Educ., 874 F.2d
1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The cornerstone of [IDEA] is the 'free appropriat. public education.").
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The JEP is defined as a written statement dsveloped annually for
each child with a disability. It is developed in a meeting that must include the teacher, a
representative of the public agency who is qualified to supervise or provide special education, the
child's parents, and-whenever appropriate-the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The requirements
for the IEP are specific and result in a detailed and lengthy document that must include the
following:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement
of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the educational
instructional services to be provided to such child and the extent to which su.-h child will be able
to participate in regular educational programs, (D) a statement of the needel transition services
for students beginning no later than age 16 and annually thereafter (and, when determined
appropriate for the individual, beginning at age 14 or younger), including, when appropriate, a
statement of the interagency responsibilities or linkages (or both) before the student leaves the
school setting, (E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and
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courts, the most severely disabled children-even if profoundly mentally
retarded and multiply disabled-are entitled to public school services
and the free appropriate education guaranteed by the Act. 9
The free appropriate education to which the disabled child is entitled
includes (1) special education, which is defined as specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents to meet the unique needs of children
with disabilities," and (2) related services, which include a myriad of
developmental, corrective, and other support services "as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education."" IDEA requires education programming for all children aged
three to twenty-one.62 Further, its regulations require an annual review of
the IEP to reconsider and revise the program, if appropriate.63 Parents
must receive prior notice of any change in the child's special education
program.' If a disabled child will suffer "significant regression of skills
or knowledge" during school vacation time, the public school may be
required to provide an extended school day or an extended school year
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at
least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved. In the case where a
participating agency, other than the educational agency, fails to provide agreed upon services,
the educational agency shall reconvene the IEP team to identify alternative strategies to meet the
transition objectives.
20 U.S.C. § 140 1(a)(20).
59. See Timothy W. v. Rochester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 960 (1st Cir. 1989). The child in this
case suffered from spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and cortical blindness. Id. at
956. The school district proposed to offer no education because it claimed the child could not benefit
from one. Id. One physician noted that the boy responded to sounds and recommended physical
therapy and stimulation; another physician stated that the child had no educational potential. Id. The
court determined that IDEA was intended to ensure that all children with disabilities receive a free
appropriate education regardless of the severity of the disability. Id. at 960. The First Circuit
remanded the case for the development of an appropriate individual education plan and for a
determination of damages. Id. at 973.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). The services that a public school would be required to provide a
disabled child include "speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling
services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). See, e.g., Polk v.
Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that school
must provide fourteen-year-old, who was suffering from effects of encephalopathy and had mental
and physical capacities of toddler, with services of licensed physical therapist).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B).
63. 34 C.F.Rt § 300.343 note (1996).
64. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a)(1). Changes in placement also are subject to the IEP requirements. Id.
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for the disabled child.65 If a disabled child's IEP determines that the child
requires the structure of a residential program, the school district may be
responsible for the entire cost of the residential program.' 5
In addition to the IEP meeting at which parents must participate,
numerous other procedural protections permeate the Act. 7 Parents must
receive written notice if a school proposes (or refuses) either to initiate or
to change the educational placement of the child.68 The school must
provide the parents with an opportunity to present complaints relating to
any matter respecting the child's educational placement. 9 If the parents'
complaints are not resolved to their satisfaction, they are entitled to an
impartial due process hearing before a hearing officer who is not
employed by the school district or state education deparnent. ° If, after
the hearing officer renders a decision, the parents still are not satisfied,
65. See Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1470 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rettig v. Kent City Sch.
Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768,778 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (noting potential of providing extended school year if
necessary to permit child to benefit from instruction)); see also Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269,
280 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that state administrative policy setting a limit of 1 30 days of instruction
per year for all children was incompatible with IDEA requirement of free apprcpriate education).
66. See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Kruelle v. New Castle County
Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). Schools may not be required to pay for medical treatment
that is not considered a "related service," see Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Edu,'., 769 F. Supp. 1313,
1329 (D.NJ. 1991) (drug treatment program not related service), but schools axe required to pay for
transportation to residential placements, see Taylor v. Board of Educ., 649 F. Supp. 1253, 1259
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), and may be required to provide transportation to an after-school caretaker, even if
the after-school caretaker is outside the school district, see Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1936).
67. For an examination of the struggle to define the roles of parent and educator under IDEA, see
David M. Engel, Essay, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the
Construction of Difference, 1991 Duke L.J. 166, 169. Professor Engel concludes that IDEA's "goal
of creating a partnership has clashed repeatedly with community-level norms and expectations." Id.
at 169.
This trend toward procedural rights coincided with the general trend during the same period that
IDEA was enacted toward the use of procedural guarantees as a constraint on government agencies.
See Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
1973, 1974-84 (1997).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1994). Some states have established procedures parallel to those
of IDEA to ensure that its requirements are met. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1t415 (1994) with, e.g.,
105 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/14-1.02, 5/14-8.02 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). This Article addresses only the
requirements of the federal statute.
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). Parents must receive an opportunity "to examine all relevant records
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child" and "to obtain
an independent educational evaluation of the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A). At the hearing,
parents have the right to counsel; the right to present evidence; the right to coafront, cross-examine,
and compel attendance of witnesses; the right to a written or electronic record of the proceedings;
and the right to written findings of fact and decisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d).
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they may appeal and receive a hearing at the state educational agency,
which must also conduct an impartial review of the first hearing. 1 If the
parents still are not satisfied after the state educational agency has
reached a final decision, a lawsuit may be commenced in either state
court or federal district court.7' If the parents prevail, the courts may
award them attorneys fees.73
IDEA thus recognizes the singular demands that a disabled child may
make in the educational setting:
At the heart of IDEA's "individualized education program"
provision is the idea that each disabled child's particular needs are
unique and thus require an educational program specifically
tailored to a child's particular disability. Courts have viewed the
failure to provide a program specifically designed to meet the
unique needs of a child as a failure to provide a free appropriate
education.74
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined, however, that school
districts are not required under the statute to maximize the potential of
disabled children.75 The Court stated that the intent of the Act was "to
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). The statute provides that the court shall 'receive the records of the
administrative proceeding, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B); see also David Neal & David Kirp, The Allure of Legalization
Reconsidered The Case of Special Education, in School Days, Rule Days: The Legalization and
Regulation of Education 343, 358-59 (David Kirp & Donald Jensen eds., 1986) (examining costs of
placing parents and schools in conflict and suggesting use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques).
74. Students With Disabilities and Special Education 16 (Data Research, Inc. ed., 1993). "The
majority of due process hearings have dealt with parent requests for more restrictive (usually private)
placements than those proposed by school personnel." Sage & Burello, supra note 20, at 56; see,
e.g., Board of Educ. v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994) (parents claiming
that modeling nondisabled students was less important than child's language skills and objecting to
school's determination that child should be placed in integrated environment); G.D. v.
Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942, 948 (Ist Cir. 1991) (parents arguing for more restrictive
placement); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 989 (1st Cir. 1990) (parents
demanding that child be placed in residential program, rather than self-contained classroom for
learning disabled in public school); Mather v. Hartford Sch. Dist., 928 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D. Vt
1996) (parents arguing for residential placement for child and challenging IEP that provided that
child would receive most of his education in mainstream classes supplemented by individual
attention in resource room); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. Sch. Dist, 520 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (parent claiming that school district's placement in less restrictive self-contained day
program inappropriate, and court ordering residential placement).
75. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982). In this case, the parents of a deaf
.ight-year-old disputed a part of their daughter's IEP. Amy, an excellent lipreader, was placed in a
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open the door of public education 7 6 to disabled children and that
"Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped
children, and to provide them with access to a free public education."'77 A
State has met the statutory requirement of providing a free appropriate
education "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction.,
71
IDEA also requires-and this is the section on which the full inclusion
advocates focus-the state to provide procedures that ensure, that
children with disabilities are educated "to the maximum extent
appropriate" with children who are not disabled.79 Removal of a disabled
child from the regular classroom should occur "only when the nature or
severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.""0 IDEA does not provide any guidance on how to strike
the proper balance between its requirements that the disabled child
receive an "appropriate education"' and that the disabled child be
educated "to the maximum extent appropriate" 2 with nondisabled
children. The next section describes how the disability inclusion
movement has evolved and how its proponents would strike that balance.
regular kindergarten program, a placement with which the parents agreed, and she was provided with
a hearing aid that amplified words spoken into a wireless receiver. Though Amy successfully
completed her kindergarten year, her parents insisted that she be provided with a sign-language
interpreter in all of her academic classes in the first grade. The school district and an interpreter who
had been assigned to Amy for two weeks during the kindergarten year both agreed that Amy did not
need the services of an interpreter at that time. The parents demanded and received a due process
hearing when their request for an interpreter was denied, and the case eventually was heard by the
United States Supreme CourL
76. Id at 192 ("The intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to
handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any parlicular level of education once
inside.").
77. Id. at 200.
78. Id. at203.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994). The regulations promulgated pursuant to IDEA refer to this
provision as requiring the "least restrictive environment." 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note (1996). Courts
and commentators also refer to the "least restrictive environment." See, e.g., County of San Diego v.
California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that every effort
must be made to place handicapped child in "least restrictive envirornment").
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)03).
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C. The Inclusion Movement
The passage of IDEA solved the problem of excluding disabled
students from educational services.83 In fact, government reports show
that few disabled students are now segregated in separate facilities.
Although "proponents of total inclusion imply that many children are
still in residential schools and other segregated facilities,"' 4 the U.S.
Department of Education reported in 1992 that ninety-three percent of
students with disabilities receive their education in regular schools, with
much of the remaining seven percent in residential placements because
of parent demand.8"
The call for full inclusion in the regular classroom for all students with
disabilities did not commence immediately after the statute was passed.
Rather, it emerged over time as its advocates began to question the idea
of special placement for disabled students within regular schools. IDEA
requires a continuum of alternative placements for children with
disabilities that ranges from full-time placement in general classrooms to
placement in residential schools or hospitals.86 At first, arguments about
placement centered on the social benefits that would occur when students
with disabilities were moved from segregated special schools to regular
schools where they could interact with nondisabled peers.8"
"Mainstreaming" was the term first used to describe the integration of
children with disabilities into the regular classroom. As explained above,
the PARC and Mills opinions were forces behind the initial passage of
IDEA in 1975,88 and they also greatly influenced the mainstreaming
movement.89 The PARC consent agreement stated that separate classes
83. William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, 48 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Winter 1985, at 7, 52 ("Mhe most obvious and shocking problem with which the legislation
was concerned-the complete exclusion of handicapped children from schools-was the most
completely solved.").
84. Sherrill, supra note 18, at 28.
85. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Educ., Fourteenth Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 22 (1992)).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16)(A) (1994).
87. Murray-Seegert, supra note 39, at 23.
88. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430; see also
Yudof et al., supra note 46, at 719-20; Stephen R. Goldstein et al., Law and Public Education:
Cases and Materials 977 (3d ed. 1995) ("As a direct response to these cases," Congress passed
several federal statutes, including the EAHCA, which later was renamed IDEA).
89. See Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate Education". The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1120 (1979) (noting that concept of
mainstreaming gained legal significance following consent decree in PARC).
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give rise to social stigma and that placement in a regular public school
class is "preferable to placement... in any other type of program."'
Under the mainstreaming model, a disabled child's primary placement
would be in a special education class, but the child would be
mainstreamed in the general education class for part of the day.9 The
concept of education in the least restrictive environment was thus
incorporated into IDEA.
Beginning in the 1980s, advocates of the full inclusion model built on
this argument, and eventually completely shunned the special education
classroom setting.92 Some commentators believe that the inclusion
movement had its origins in a 1986 article by Madeleine Will-then
Assistant Secretary of Education-who described the limitations of
educating children with learning disabilities in separate special classes
and called for more effort from the regular education programs.93 Others
contend that the movement began years earlier when educators
questioned the practice of educating the disabled, especially the mildly
mentally retarded, in separate classes.94 These reformers claimed that
labeling a child and removing the child from the regular classroom
stigmatized the child, a stigma that far outweighed the doubtful benefit of
segregated classes.9" But despite the problems they perceived with
special classes, many reformers did not push for full inclusion of all
disabled students. Rather, they argued for a "cascade" of services to
90. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
91. See Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is It Required?, 95 Educ. L.
Rep. 823, 824 (1995).
92. See James M. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan, Full Inclusion in Historical Context, in The
Illusion of Full Inclusion: A Comprehensive Critique of a Current Special Education Bandwagon 3
(James M. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan eds., 1995).
93. See Melvin, supra note 14, at 601-02 n.10 (referring to Madeleine C. Will, Educating
Children With Learning Problems: A Shared Responsibility, 52 Exceptional Children 411 (1986)).
94. Some scholars assert that "two articles that were particularly influential in shaping advocacy
for mainstreaming... and setting the course toward full inclusion" were written by Lloyd Dunn and
Evelyn Deno. Kauffman & Hallahan, Full Inclusion in Historical Context, i The Illusion of Full
Inclusion, supra note 92, at 4 (citing Lloyd Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is
Much of it Justifiable?, 35 Exceptional Children 5 (1968) and Evelyn Deno, Special Education As
Developmental Capital, 37 Exceptional Children 229 (1970)); see also Murrny-Seegert, supra note
39, at 22 (citing Dunn's article); Note, Enforcing the Right, supra note 89, at 1119 (same).
95. See Dunn, supra note 94, at 8-9. Another argument is that special classes were a way of
maintaining racial segregation. Id. at 6-7.
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accommodate the individual differences existing among children with
disabilities.96
Many disabled students are currently included in regular and/or
resource classrooms. By 1992, government reports showed that forty-
three percent or more of all students in every disability category except
mental retardation, multiple disabilities, and deaf-blindness had been
placed in regular and/or resource classrooms.9 7 Many inclusion advocates
now propose that all students with disabilities should be placed in regular
education classes.98 As an outgrowth of a movement called the Regular
Education Initiative, which began in the 1980s, full inclusion proponents
claim that the combination of regular and special education classes "has
created a dual educational system which is dysfunctional, ineffective,
and excessively costly." 9 Advocates of full inclusion claim that the
special education resource room as well as the special self-contained
classroom is stigmatizing and segregationist.00
In addition, full inclusion advocates claim that placing the disabled
child in a general education classroom setting will improve the behavior
of the disabled child by providing the child with appropriate positive role
models."° Those who oppose full inclusion claim that this "[i]deology
backed by testimonial has led to advocacy for certain practices [like full
inclusion] as being the panacea, with a blatant disregard for the
individual differences inherent in the population classified as disabled or
within any one of the disability categories.' 0 2
Despite the fact that the word "inclusion" does not appear anywhere in
IDEA, many courts that have addressed IDEA's requirement that the
disabled must be educated with the nondisabled "to the maximum extent
96. See Deno, supra note 94, at 234-36 (describing "cascade of services" needed in special
education).
97. See Sherrill, supra note 18, at 31 (citing U.S. Dep't of Educ., Fourteenth Annual Report to
Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 25 (1992)). A
resource classroom is defined as a model where the student is outside the regular class for 21% to
60% of the day, but included in the regular class at other times. See id. at 27.
98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
99. Ann M. Hocutt et al., Historical and Legal Context of Mainstreaming, in The Regular
Education Initiative: Alternative Perspectives on Concepts, Issues, and Models 17 (John Wills Lloyd
et al. eds., 1990).
100. James F. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan, From Mainstreaming to Collaborative
Consultation, in The Illusion ofFull Inclusion, supra note 92, at 6.
101. Hallenbeck & Kauffinan, supra note 18, at 46 (citing S. Stainback & W. Stainback,
Educating Children with Severe Maladaptive Behaviors 62 (1980)).
102. Donald L. MacMillan et al., The Social Context of Dunn: Then and Now, 27 J. Special Educ.
466,477(1994).
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appropriate"'' ° have been greatly influenced by the arguments of full
inclusion advocates."° The next section examines the snarled opinions
that make up the jurisprudence of inclusion.
D. The Jurisprudence ofInclusion: Chaos in the Circuits
Congress has mandated that disabled children obtain a "free
appropriate public education."'0° But Congress has also determined that
disabled children should be educated with nondisabled children to the
maximum extent appropriate and that a disabled child should be removed
from the regular classroom "only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.' 'Iee It
is the tension between the words "appropriate" that appear in these two
different sections of IDEA that accounts for the chaotic state of the
jurisprudence of inclusion. 7 Put simply, when determining the
appropriate placement for a disabled child, the school is "damned if it
does and damned if it doesn't." For example, the IEP committee from the
child's school may assert that the child can receive an appropriate
education in an environment comprised of varying degrees of
segregation, ranging from a full-time segregated classroom to a part-time
segregated classroom with integration for lunch, recess, gym, art, or
music. Many parents institute due process hearings requesting a more
restrictive environment claiming that their children will be unable to
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
104. See McCarthy, supra note 91, at 826.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) ("The state [must have] in effect a policy that assures all children with
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education.").
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
107. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting tension embodied
in IDEA); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (1Ilth Cir. 1991) (noting "tension within
the Act between two goals: mainstreaming and meeting each child's unique nleds"); Daniel RR. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that "Congress... created a tension
between two provisions of the Act").
Professor Martha Minow has examined the tension that exists when attempting to address the
needs of persons with disabilities. See generally Martha Minow, Making All the Difference:
Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 35-39 (1990) [hereinafter Minow, Making All the
Difference] (explaining that educators have problems trying to address differences among students
without stigmatizing those who are different); Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of
Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1985, at 157
(pointing out tension between need for special services and problems that occur with labeling and
segregation).
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obtain an appropriate education elsewhere.' Many other parents,
however, demand a less restrictive environment, claiming their child has
not been integrated to the maximum extent appropriate.1°9 These parents
insist that the school provide whatever supplementary aids and services
the child may need-a teacher's aide or a modified curriculum, for
example-so that the child can be educated satisfactorily in the regular
classroom.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on inclusion, and the circuit
courts of appeals have been unable to agree on how to address the issue.
The courts of appeals have offered a bewildering array of opinions
regarding the standard that federal courts must use to determine whether
a school district has integrated disabled students to the maximum extent
appropriate. Instead of emphasizing academic achievement, those who
advocate the full inclusion of children with disabilities in the general
education classroom-and now many federal courts-stress the social
benefits of such integration."0 Underlying the opinions on inclusion-
with the exception of certain opinions from the Second and Seventh
Circuitsl"'-is the courts' uncritical acceptance of the assertions of these
disability full inclusionists-that separation equals stigma and that
inclusion equals increased self-esteem."' Implicit in these opinions is the
elevation of "appropriate" integration over "appropriate" education."3
108. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.
1994); Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207-10; Greer, 950 F.2d at 690-92; Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d
688, 689-91 (2d Cir. 1989); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039; Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1060-61 (6th Cir. 1983).
110. See, e.g., J. Michael Coleman & Ann Minnett, Learning Disabilities and Social Ecological
Perspective, 59 Exceptional Children 234, 234 (1992) (noting that justification for mainstreaning
has always been based less on possible academic gains and more on potential social benefits);
Huefler, supra note 14, at 49 (citing language modeling and social interaction as primary reasons for
inclusion); Shanker, supra note 14, at 39 ("[Those demanding full inclusion are interested in only
one thing--socialization.").
I 11. See infra Part II.D.2.
112. See, e.g., Howard P. Blackman, Surmounting the Disability of Isolation, 49 Sch.
Administrator 28, 29 (1992) (asserting that focus in special education should be on location where
support is provided to disabled students because being removed from regular classroom results in
stigma and isolation).
113. The Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have applied a test that focuses on the "feasibility" of
transporting special services to the general education classroom. See infra notes 120-33 and
accompanying text. The Third, Fifth and Eleventh circuits use a four-factor balancing test to
determine if education in the regular classroom with the use of supplemental aids and services can be
achieved satisfactorily. See infra notes 134-56 and accompanying text The Ninth Circuit declined to
follow either line of cases, and developed a test that includes some factors from each. See infra notes
157-61 and accompanying text In contrast, the Second Circuit took a totally different course and
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The next section attempts to untangle the perplexing collection of
standards that has been set forth by the courts.114
Not surprisingly, with the amorphous term "appropriate" as the guide,
the federal courts have struggled mightily with the contours of the
statutory terms that mandate a free appropriate education for disabled
children and that require integration with nondisabled students to the
deferred to the judgment of the educators making the placement decision and the hearing officer that
upheld it. See infra Part II.D.2.
114. In addition to the division in the circuits regarding the substantive standard for the least
restrictive environment, there are other conflicts in the circuit courts regardirg the interpretation of
IDEA. First, the circuits are split with regard to which party has the burden of proof in the district
court. Some circuits have held that the burden rests with the party that is challenging the
administrative agency decision. See, e.g., Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (lst
Cir. 1990) (stating that burden rests with complaining party); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884,
887 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that party challenging administrative determination has burden of
persuading court that hearing officer was wrong). But the Third Circuit expressly rejected these
cases and held that the school district maintains the burden of proof throughout. Oberti, 995 F.2d at
1218-19.
Second, the standard for judicial review has presented a knotty problem. Paents may challenge a
school district placement decision at two administrative levels: through the due process hearing
before an impartial hearing officer and, where provided by the state, through subsequent appeal to
the state administrative level. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. Parents can then
further appeal to the district courts, but the courts have disagreed concerning the proper standard of
judicial review. IDEA requires a district court reviewing a challenge under IDEA to "receive the
records of the administrative proceedings.... hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and,
basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence," grant any appropriate relief. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2) (1994). Thus, "judicial review in IDEA cases differs substantially from judicial review
of other agency actions, in which courts generally are confined to the admini;trative record and are
held to a highly deferential standard of review." Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467,
1471 (9th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, "[t]he fact that § 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court
'receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement
that due weight shall be given to these proceedings." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206
(1982). Not surprisingly, the courts have had great difficulty agreeing on a standard of judicial
review, and the standards set forth by the courts of appeal range across a wide spectrum. Some
courts describe the district court's review as "virtually de novo." See, e.g., Teague Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993). Other courts give "deference to the findings of
the original administrative factfinder" and "even greater deference" when the original hearing officer
and the state review officers agree. See Combs v. School Bd., 15 F.3d 357, 361 (4th Cir. 1994); see
also Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993) (modified de novo review); Roland M.,
910 F.2d at 990 ("involved oversight").
Third, circuits disagree regarding IDEA's prescription that the district court "shall hear additional
evidence at the request of a party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). The First and Ninth Circuits have taken a
restrictive approach to the term "additional," interpreting it to mean "supplemental." See Town of
Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (Ist Cir. 1984). The Sxth Circuit disagreed,
stating that "the limitation on what can be joined inherent in the term 'supplement' is not present in
the term 'add."' Metropolitan Gov't v. Cook, 915 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990).
With this much conflict in the circuits over so many issues relating to inclusion and placement,
there can be little doubt that different jurisdictions are likely to spawn different outcomes for
litigants.
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maximum extent appropriate. Although a disabled child can be removed
from the regular classroom "only when the nature or severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily,"
'' 5
IDEA provides little guidance for determining how many aids and
services might be required when attempting to educate a disabled child in
the regular classroom or at what point education in the regular classroom
becomes unsatisfactory." 6 The federal regulations state that children with
disabilities must be educated in "the least restrictive environment,""' 7 and
the courts often use that term, together with "mainstreaming," to describe
the statute's preference for integration." 8
The courts generally have attempted to interpret the requirements of
IDEA by using a cost/benefit analysis of sorts, weighing the academic
and nonacademic benefits to the disabled child against the costs-both
the cost in resources to the public school and the effect on the education
of the nondisabled children in the regular classroom community."9 At
the heart of this analysis, however, is a more subtle contemplation of
benefit. In essence, many of the courts addressing the inclusion issue
discount the academic benefit to the disabled child to serve the so-called
nonacademic benefits of inclusion.
1. Promoting "Appropriate" Integration Over "Appropriate"
Education
When the mother of a nine-year-old severely mentally retarded
child' challenged her son's placement in a county school for mentally
retarded children, the district court determined that the school district had
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
116. See Note, Enforcing the Right, supra note 89, at 1119 (noting lack of guidelines for
determining when education in regular classroom becomes unsatisfactory).
117. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550, .552(d) (1996).
118. See supra Part lI.C for a discussion of the evolution of mainstreaming to inclusion.
119. See infra Part I.D.1. Some courts are more explicit than others in weighing cost against
benefit, and the courts have not always agreed in describing the cost and benefit. See infra notes
137-39, 157-61. For instance, although the court in Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983), did not expressly state it was doing so, the "feasibility" test is a shorthand method for
weighing cost against benefit See also A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist, 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th
Cir. 1987) (noting that Roncker allowed courts to consider cost to local school district and benefit to
child).
120. The child, Neill, was classified as Trainable Mentally Retarded, a category of children with
an IQ below 50. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
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"broad discretion in the placement of handicapped children."' 2' The
district court maintained that the school district had not abused its
discretion, especially because the boy, who had a mentad age of two to
three years and required almost constant supervision, had made no
significant progress in the eighteen months he had spent in an integrated
environment while the administrative and court actions were pending. 2 2
In fact, the district court had found that the boy "was not progressing in
his present placement but was regressing. His ability to interact with the
non-handicapped children was at best minimal. His opportunity to
interact with the non-handicapped children there was also very
minimal.' '
The Sixth Circuit determined that the abuse of discretion standard was
improper and set up a test for determining when placement is
appropriate: "where the segregated facility is considered superior, the
court should determine whether the services which make that placement
superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting."' 24 If so,
the segregated placement is inappropriate."2 The court thus transformed
the inclusion requirement "from a negative one-do not segregate
unnecessarily-to a positive one-provide all the services that render
segregation unnecessary."'26
The court emphasized the overriding importance of integration above
education by warning that "[i]n some cases, a placement that may be
considered better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because
121. Id. at 1061 (discussing district court determination).
122. Id. (describing procedural history of case). After evaluation, the school district decided to
place Neill in a county school for mentally retarded children. His parents refused to accept the
placement and sought the first level of administrative hearing provided for by IDEA, the due process
hearing. The hearing officer found that the school district had not satisfied its burden of showing that
the placement would afford Neill the maximum appropriate contact with nondisabled children. The
school district appealed and the second level of administrative hearings was held before the State
Board of Education. Id. at 1060-61. For a description of the levels of hearings provided for in IDEA,
see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. The State Board determined that Neill should be
placed in the county school, but that he should receive contact with nondisabled students during
lunch, recess, and transportation to and from school. Neill's mother filed an action in district court.
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1061.
123. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1064 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1063. The standard had also been called the "portability" standard. See Huefher, supra
note 14, at 31. Determining whether services could be provided feasibly may be problematic,
"depending upon which definition of the word 'feasible' the panel intends, i.e., (1) capable of being
done; (2) capable of being dealt with successfully, suitable; or (3) reasonable." Roncker, 700 F.2d at
1066 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
126. Weber, supra note 2, at 391.
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of the failure to provide for mainstreaming."' Even if a child obtains
only marginal benefits in the regular classroom, the court indicated that
those marginal benefits must be far outweighed by benefits obtained in
the segregated setting for education in a special education classroom to
be appropriate.' The court also seemed to suggest that any benefit at all
to the disabled child would be enough to mandate placement in the
regular classroom.
2 9
The district court in Roncker relied on expert testimony that the
education program in the segregated placement was superior to the
program available in the regular classroom and that the child was making
no progress in the regular classroom. 3 ' The Sixth Circuit stated that
"[t]he perception that a segregated institution is academically superior
for a handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic disagreement
with the mainstreaming concept.'' Of course, the testimony that a
segregated placement is academically superior for a disabled child may
also reflect the fact that in the particular case at hand segregated
placement simply is academically superior.
32
The Fourth and Eighth circuits have adopted the Roncker test,' but
the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected it in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of
127. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 (emphasis added); see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.,
910 F.2d 983, 992 (lst Cir. 1990) ("Mainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill substantive
educational criteria.").
128. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
129. Id. (discussing the "possibility that some handicapped children simply must be educated in
segregated facilities.., because 'the handicapped child would not benefit' from mainstreaming");
see also id. at 1065 (Kennedy, ., dissenting) (noting parent's argument for regular school setting
unless child could learn "zero" in such environment); cf DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882
F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that inclusion is not appropriate where disabled student
"would simply be monitoring classes"); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 161, 164
(8th Cir. 1987) (upholding separate class where district court found that only possible benefit was
opportunity to observe nondisabled children); Liscio v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., 734 F. Supp. 689,
701 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (stating placement inappropriate where student received little or no educational
benefit).
130. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1061 (describing district court's decision).
131. Id. at 1063.
132. The court of appeals cited nothing in the record that would lead to the conclusion that the
expert actually had a "basic disagreement with the mainstreaming concept." Id. at 1063. Nor did the
court hint at how a future court could tell if such a disagreement was indeed the driving force behind
the school's determination. According to the Roncker court then, the assertion that a segregated
classroom is academically superior is to be given little or no weight. Any time it is claimed that a
segregated classroom is academically superior, that statement may be disregarded as based on an
improper motive, and the court can then substitute its own judgment.
133. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining disagreement among the circuits).
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Education.' Daniel was a six-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome
whose developmental age was between two and three years and whose
communication skills were slightly less than a two-year-old. At his
parent's request, he was placed in a regular, pre-kindergarten half-day
class, and spent the other half of the day in a program devoted entirely to
special education. His teacher in the general education classroom
reported that Daniel did not master any of the skills she was trying to
teach, that Daniel did not participate without constant, individual
attention from the teacher or aide, and that she would need to modify her
teaching method and curriculum almost beyond recognition to reach
Daniel. The school's special education committee recommended that
Daniel's placement be changed to full-time special education but also
recommended that Daniel have contact with nondisabled children at
lunch and during recess. His parents requested and obtained a due
process hearing. After five days of testimony amounting to 2500 pages of
transcript, the hearing officer determined that the regular classroom was
not the appropriate placement for Daniel.'35 Daniel's parents then filed
suit in district court, which affirmed the hearing officer's ruling.'36
On appeal the Fifth Circuit declined "to adopt the [Roncker] approach
that other circuits have taken."' 37 Instead, the Fifth Circuit devised a new
test based on a two-part inquiry: "whether education in the regular
classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services can be
achieved satisfactorily" and, if not, "whether the school has
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate."'38 To aid in
the first inquiry, the court pointed to four factors that should be
considered: (1) whether the school has taken steps to accommodate the
child in the regular classroom by providing supplementary aids and
services and by modifying the curriculum; (2) if so, whether those steps
are sufficient; (3) whether the child will receive an educational benefit;
and (4) the effect the child's presence has on the regular classroom
environment; that is, whether the child is so disruptive that the education
of other students is significantly impaired, or the child requires so much
attention that the teacher must "ignore" the needs of other students.' 39
134. 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1039.
136. Id. at 1040.
137. Id. at 1046.
138. Id. at 1048.
139. Id. at 1048-49. After applying its new test, the court determined that the school had
integrated Daniel with nondisabled students to the maximum extent appropriate by including him
with other students at lunch and recess. Id. at 1050-51.
800
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The Fifth Circuit also decided that academic achievement is of lesser
importance to the disabled child than social benefits. The court focused
on the "overall growth and development benefits"'" rather than the
"potential for learning to read," because "academic achievement is not
the only purpose of mainstreaming."'' Indeed, the court cited Roncker
for the proposition that even if "a child may be able to absorb only a
minimal amount of the regular education program" and "even if the child
cannot flourish academically," the child "may" benefit from "the
language models that his nonhandicapped peers provide for him," and
this benefit may "tip the balance in favor of mainstreaming" despite lack
of academic progress.42
Both the Third and the Eleventh Circuits expressly adopted the Daniel
R.R. test. 43 In its application by these courts, the Daniel R.R. test proved
to be "anything but deferential" to the decision made by the school.'4 In
Greer v. Rome City School District,45 the school district proposed an IEP
for a child with Down's Syndrome and several resulting disabilities,
including speech and learning disabilities. The IEP recommended a
special self-contained classroom because, as school officials explained to
the child's parents, she required more attention than other children in the
regular kindergarten class, she was not keeping up with the kindergarten
curriculum, and she required repeated rehearsal and practice of basic
skills in an individualized setting. The school psychologist expressed his
belief that, although the child might make some progress in a regular
kindergarten class, she would make more progress in a special education
class. The Greer Court determined that the school officials had not met
the requirements of IDEA because the school had not adequately
considered the full range of supplemental aids and services that the
school might have provided to accommodate the child's disabilities in
the regular classroom, had failed to modify the curriculum to
accommodate the child, and had developed the IEP before meeting with
the parents.'46
140. Id. at 1047 n.8.
141. Id. at 1049; see also Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 990 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that
placement in regular classroom is beneficial in terms of social development).
142. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 (emphasis added) (citing Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1063 (6th Cir. 1983)).
143. See Oberti v. Board of Edue., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch.
Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991).
144. Melvin, supra note 14, at 665-66.
145. 950 F.2d 688 (1Ith Cir. 1991).
146. Id. at 698.
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The Third Circuit, in Oberti v. Board of Education,117 applied the
Daniel R.R. test in analyzing the segregated placement of a six-year-old
boy with Down's Syndrome. The boy had a history of "serious
behavioral problems" in a regular "developmental" kindergarten class-a
general education class for children who were not fully ready for
kindergarten.148 The problems included "repeated toileting accidents,
temper tantrums, crawling and hiding under furniture, touching, hitting
and spitting on other children" and striking at and hitting the teacher and
teacher's aide on several occasions. An extra aide in the class "did little
to resolve the behavior problems."' 49 The parents wanted the child to be
placed in regular kindergarten but, after mediation, agreed to place the
boy in a segregated class for the multiply handicapped with one teacher,
one aide, and nine children. The boy's behavior gradually improved, his
disruptiveness abated, and he made academic progress. 50 His parents
nonetheless decided that they wanted the boy placed in a regular
classroom and brought a due process complaint, which eventually was
heard by the Third Circuit. The court upheld the district court's
determination that the school district had violated IDEA because it had
not adequately considered supplementary aids and services to
accommodate the boy's disability in the regular classroom."' According
to the court, the school must consider an astounding range of
supplemental aids and services to accommodate one child in the regular
classroom. These include "'resource rooms and itinerant instruction,'
speech and language therapy, special education training; for the regular
teacher, behavior modification programs, or any other available aids or
services appropriate to the child's particular disabilities."'52 In addition,
the school must try to "modify the regular education program to
accommodate [the] disabled child."' A child may be disruptive, said the
court, because adequate aids and services have not been provided.5 4
147. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 1207-08.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1209.
151. Id. at 1223.
152. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added) (quoting Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696
(1lth Cir. 1991)); see also Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
placement in segregated classroom is inappropriate if services which make tiat placement superior
could feasibly be provided in a non-segregated setting).
153. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
154. Id. at 1217. The Third Circuit thus would appear to require more aids and services than the
Fifth Circuit requires. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989)
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The Eleventh and Third Circuits also have elevated inclusion over
academic achievement. The Eleventh Circuit stated that even if a
disabled child "will make academic progress more quickly in a self-
contained special education environment," placement in such an
environment may not be justified unless the child would make
"significantly more progress" there and placement in the regular
classroom might cause the disabled child to "fall behind" his- or her
disabled peers who are placed in the segregated classroom.' Thus,
integration is inappropriate only when it would be measurably
detrimental to the child, even if a special classroom would be better for
the child's academic progress. Similarly, the Third Circuit stated that "a
determination that a child with disabilities might make greater academic
progress in a segregated, special education class may not warrant
excluding that child from a regular classroom environment."'56
The Ninth Circuit put a slightly different gloss on the standard for
inclusion. 7 The court of appeals expressly adopted a four-factor
balancing test that had been used by the district court and that employed
"factors found in both [the Roncker and Daniel R.R.] lines of cases."'58
The district court had determined, and the court of appeals appeared to
accept, that a disabled child must be educated in a regular classroom
even if "a special education placement may be academically superior to
placement in a regular classroom" and "even if [the regular classroom] is
not the best academic setting for the child."'5 9 The district court had
conceded that if a child's disabilities are "so severe that he or she will
("States need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service" to accommodate the child
in the regular classroom.).
155. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
156. Oberd, 995 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit has also noted the "unique
benefits the child may obtain from integration" like social and communication skills and improved
self-esteem. Id.
157. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming district court's decision that appropriate placement for child was in regular second grade
classroom).
158. Id. The four factors are: (1) educational benefits of placement full time in a regular
classroom; (2) nonacademic benefits of such placement; (3) effect on the teacher and children in the
regular class; and (4) cost. Id.
159. Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (emphasis added), affd
sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). The
Rachel H. decision is in contrast to an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion where the court deferred to the
judgment of the educators seeking to transfer a child to a segregated classroom. In Wilson v. Marana
Unified School District, 735 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1984), the court determined that if a
student with disabilities is not making satisfactory progress in the current placement, the school may
transfer the child to a school where she can receive assistance from a teacher especially qualified
regarding that disability.
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receive little or no academic benefit from placement in a regular
education class, then mainstreaming may not be appropriate."'' Stressing
the nonacademic social benefits like language modeling and "improved
self-esteem" that a disabled child may obtain from placement in the
regular classroom with nondisabled students, the court also opined that
improved self-esteem was likely to increase academic achievement.1
6
'
2. Promoting "Appropriate" Education Over "Appropriate"
Integration
Not every court addressing inclusion has elevated academic setting
over academic progress. The Second Circuit expressly rejected the
Roncker analysis and determined that it was not the role! of the courts to
decide whether the special education services provided to a disabled
child could be provided in a less segregated setting than that proposed by
the child's IEP committee. 62 In Briggs v. Board of Education,163 the IEP
committee had proposed that the child, who suffered from a moderate to
severe sensorineural hearing loss in both ears and mild to moderate
speech and language delays, be placed in a special pre-school that met in
a regular elementary school. Because the child had significant speech and
language problems that interfered with communication to peers and
adults, the committee believed the child's needs would not be met in a
general education program. The proposed special prognam consisted of
seven children, two teacher aides, and a certified teacher of the hearing
impaired who possessed a Master's degree in education of the deaf. The
child also would have the services of a speech therapist. Students usually
spent one or two years in the special program and were then placed in a
general education program. The parents believed that the child should
have more interaction with nondisabled children and exercised their right
to a due process hearing. The hearing officer determined that the
program proposed was appropriate for the child, and the parents then
filed a lawsuit in federal district court."M
160. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 878 (emphasis added). Given the court's use of the term "may,"
rather than "will," inclusion apparently could be appropriate-according to this court--even in some
instances where the disabled child receives little or no academic benefit from placement in the
regular education class.
161. Id. at 879.
162. Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 690-91.
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The district court applied the Roncker test, calling the test "insightful
and useful," 6 ' and reversed the decision of the administrative hearing
officer, stating that the disabled child "could feasibly have been offered
[services] in a much less segregated setting."'" The Second Circuit
reversed the district court, chastising it for substituting its judgment for
that of the local education agency, which had expertise in the formulation
of educational programs for the handicapped. 67 The court of appeals
stressed that it was not the court's role to decide the very question that
the Roncker test poses: whether the same services the child obtains in a
segregated setting could be provided in a less segregated setting. 6 '
Instead, the Briggs court pointed out that the placement decision was
calculated to provide the child with the best educational program
feasible, and that the placement decision was reached after careful
consideration by experts on teaching the hearing impaired and with full
knowledge of the legislative preference for mainstreaming.'69 The court
of appeals reasoned that the placement decision had been upheld by the
hearing officer and the state agency; therefore, the district court erred in
substituting its judgment for that of those entities. 7 '
165. Briggs v. Board of Educ., 707 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D. Conn. 1988), rev'd, 882 F.2d 688
(2d Cir. 1989).
166. Id. at 626-27.
167. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 693.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 692-93.
170. Id. But see Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 987 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying Daniel R.
test to determine "compliance with IDEA's mainstreaming requirement!').
The Seventh Circuit showed a similar deference to the educational policy judgments made by local
and state officials, at least when the inclusion issue is intertwined with issues of educational
methodology. In Lachman v. Illinois Board of Education, 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988), the school
proposed placing the child in a self-contained classroom for the hearing impaired for all or part of
the day where the child would be taught based on the "total communication" approach to educating
the hearing impaired. Id. at 291-92. The parents disagreed with the placement and claimed that the
child could best be taught in a regular classroom with the assistance of a full-time cued speech
instructor. The court determined that the inclusion issue was subsumed by the parties' disagreement
over educational methodology---"cued speech" versus "total communication." Id. at 294. Because
courts must give "substantial deference" to policy judgments regarding educational methodology
made by local and state education officials, the court held that the placement proposed by the school
was appropriate. Id. at 297. The court stated that the integration inquiry cannot be evaluated in the
abstract. "Rather, that laudable policy must be weighed in tandem with the Act's principal goal of
ensuring that the public schools provide handicapped children with a free appropriate education." Id.
at 296. But cf. Board of Educ. v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 1991)
(determining that parents' hostility to proposed IEP can be considered in determining if IEP will
benefit child).
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The Second Circuit explained that "[w]hile mainstreaming is an
important objective, we are mindful that the presumption in favor of
mainstreaming must be weighed against the importance: of providing an
appropriate education to handicapped students....' The .3riggs court thus
set up a standard that seems to allow courts and schools to elevate
educational progress over educational setting. Many full inclusion
advocates and the federal courts that have accepted the premises
underlying the full inclusion movement, however, would allow the
placement of the disabled child to outweigh that child's academic
achievement. t7 2 The next section demonstrates that elevating inclusion
over academic progress cannot be defended in terms of either IDEA's
statutory language, its legislative intent, or by U.S. Supreme Court
precedent describing the content of free appropriate education.
III. THE CORNERSTONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Advocates of full inclusion contend that the pronouncements of many
federal courts have strengthened their hand. Indeed, one federal court
has stated that "[i]nclusion is a right, not a privilege for a select few."'74
Thus, "[a]rmed with a string of court decisions, [inclusion advocates]
have made significant progress toward their goal of including all children
with disabilities in the regular classroom." 75
171. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 692; see also Board of Educ. v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[Ihe mainstreaming requirement was developed in response to school districts
which were reluctant to integrate mentally impaired children and their nondisabled peers. It was not
developed to promote integration with nondisabled peers at the expense of other IDEA requirements
and is applicable only if the IEP meets IDEA minimums.").
172. See supra Part ll.D.I.
173. See, e.g., Nancy Webb, Special Education: With New Court Decisions Backing Them,
Advocates See Inclusion as a Question of Values, Harv. Educ. Letter, July-Aug. 1994, at 1, 1. Some
claim that IDEA has been interpreted by courts as a 'mandate for inclusion, 'if educating the child in
the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support services, can be achieved
satisfactorily."' Id.; see also Melvin, supra note 14, at 667 ("IDEA contemplates that ... most
disabled children... can now be successfully educated in the regular education classroom.').
174. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1404 (D.N.J. 1992), aj'd, 995 F.2d 1204
(3d Cir. 1993); see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 14, at 560-61 (noting "marked shift in the
outcome of federal litigation" toward upholding parental requests to place children in general
education program, and observing that judges "have become more knowledgeable about, and more
sympathetic to, inclusion").
175. Inclusion Can Mean Exclusion to Deaf Students, 2 Inclusive Educ. Pograms, Dec. 1995, at
1, 1; see also McCarthy, supra note 91, at 826 (noting "judicial shift toward inclusion"). As a result
of recent court opinions, some school districts in California feel the proper course of action is full
inclusion: "place all handicapped children in regular education classes, regardless of their mental,
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Full inclusion is superficially appealing. It is simple-one placement
of all students-and it is egalitarian-when students are not physically
separated they are assumed to be treated equitably.'76 Certainly,
excluding disabled children from the public schools and segregating
disabled students without regard to how and whether the difference
caused by the disability affects their achievement in the classroom were
serious wrongs that IDEA sought to correct. Yet the statutory language in
IDEA does not mandate full inclusion, despite the inclusion advocates'
claim. Furthermore, the statute does not require that a disabled child be
included in a regular classroom when the child "cannot flourish
academically""' and when another placement would be "academically
superior" to placement in the regular classroom.7 8
A. ".A Free Appropriate Public Education "
Of course, "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or
sections, and is animated by one general purpose and intent."' 79 "[E]ach
part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole."'"8 A statutory
subsection-like the integration provision of IDEA-must not be
considered "in a vacuum," but in reference to the general purpose and
intent of the statute in its entirety.' 8' The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act and its predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, by their titles alone, stress that the education of the
disabled student-not the placement of the student-is the driving force
behind the statute. The substantive standard set forth in IDEA is that of
"free appropriate public education."18 2 Moreover, the statute expressly
physical or emotional disabilities" See Theresa Bryant, Drowning in the Mainstream: Integration of
Children With Disabilities After Oberti v. Clementon School District, 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 83, 116
(1995) (citing Sarah Lubman, More Schools Embrace "Full Inclusion" of the Disabled, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 13, 1994, at B1).
176. See James M. Kauffman & Patricia L. Pullen, Eight Myths About Special Education, Focus
on Exceptional Children, Jan. 1996, at 1, 6.
177. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
178. See Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878-79 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom.
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Kauffman &
Pullen, supra note 176, at 6 (writing that placing all children in general education classroom has
negative consequences for some students where neither disabled student nor their classmates can be
well served).
179. 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994).
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requires "special education" for the disabled child, which is defined as
instruction designed to meet the disabled child's unique needs." 3 Indeed,
in enacting IDEA, Congress expressly found that the "special
educational needs of... children [with disabilities] are not being fully
met."'" It is not clear that those special educational needs would be met
fully-if at all-when a child is included in a regular classroom even
though the child would make greater academic progress in another
setting.
Segregated placements may be necessary to meet the unique needs of
a disabled child, and Congress explicitly recognized the need for
segregated placement when it expressly provided that special education
may include "instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in
hospitals and institutions, and in other settings.... ."'s In fact, the U.S.
Supreme Court has pointed out that Congress "recognized that regular
classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of
many handicapped children." ' 6 Thus, far from mandating full inclusion,
the statute stresses that the needs of disabled children may be unique and
thus different from the needs of nondisabled children, and it then sets
forth various settings where the child's unique needs may be met.8 7
Indeed, the very name of the plan that must be developed for each
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994).
184. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
185. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16)(A) (emphasis added).
186. Board ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 n.4 (1982) (emphasis added). Of course, those
who advocate full inclusion ignore this statement by the Court. See, e.g., Melvin, supra note 14, at
667 ("IDEA contemplates that.., most disabled children.., can now be successfully educated in
the regular education classroom.") (emphasis added). In addition, the Court's decision in Florence
County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), in which the Cc.urt stated that parents
were not barred from reimbursement for the cost of private school placement in a resident school that
specialized in educating students with disabilities, "runs counter to the inclusionary movement under
the IDEA that is currently being embraced by the courts and the Clinton Administration." Perry A.
Zirkel, A Somewhat Ironic Decision, 75 Phi Delta Kappan 497, 498 (1994). To the extent that the
Court has provided a "financial incentive or reward for parents to put their child in a segregated
setting-here to the point of choosing a residential placement-it conflicts with the emphasis on
educating students with disabilities as much as possible in regular classrooms." Id.
187. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16)(A). Kauffman and Hallahan comment:
IDEA prescribes, first, the determination of appropriate education and relatcd services and, only
subsequently, that the least restrictive environment for delivery of those services be
determined-in all instances, on a case-by-case basis. Contrary to IDEA, advocates of full
inclusion call for a uniform placement decisionfirst, followed by consideration of what might
constitute an appropriate education and related services that could b,. delivered in that
placement.
Kauffman & Hallahan, Full Inclusion in Historical Context, in The Illusion of Full Inclusion, supra
note 92, at 3.
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disabled child-the individualized education program-again
emphasizes education, and it also contemplates the unique needs of the
individual child.
IDEA's requirement that educators provide instruction that is designed
to meet the child's unique needs further shows that the transfer of
knowledge from the teacher to the disabled child is significant. In
addition, the statute requires that the IEP contain instructional
objectives, 8 ' again highlighting Congress's concern with the transfer of
knowledge to the disabled child. In short, the statute does not require a
school to place a disabled child in a setting where the child "cannot
flourish academically"'8 9 where the child obtains only "marginal
benefits,""' ° and where the child can "absorb only a minimal amount of
the regular education program."''
Even the statutory language in the integration provision of IDEA does
not elevate inclusion over the education of the disabled child. First, the
statutory language "significantly qualifies the [inclusion] requirement by
stating that it should be implemented 'to the maximum extent
appropriate.""' 92 Moreover, the statute does not state that disabled
children must be placed with children who are not disabled to the
maximum extent appropriate. Rather, it provides that, to the maximum
extent appropriate, disabled children should be educated with
nondisabled children.'93 Finally, the integration provision is inapplicable
when education with the "use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily."' 94
The regulations that implement the least restrictive environment
requirement provide that each school district must maintain a continuum
of program options including regular classes, special classes, special
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(aX20)(B).
189. See Daniel 11.11. v. State Bd. of Educ, 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
190. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
191. See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 692 (1lth Cir. 1991).
The IDEA regulations regarding "educational placement" also emphasize that the purpose of the
statute is "to ensure that each child with a disability receives an education which is appropriate to his
or her individual needs." 34 C.F.R § 300.552 note (1996) (emphasis added). To this end, the school
must provide for "alternative placements." 300 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1996) ("Each public agency
shall ensure that a continuum of alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children
with disabilities for special education and related services."). In short, the "overriding rule... is that
placement decisions must be made on an individual basis." 300 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
192. A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1982)).
193. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); see also A. W., 813 F.2d at 163.
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schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals anl institutions. 95
Thus, "the regulations contemplate that mainstreaming is not required in
every case."'
196
Further, the legislative history-to the extent legislative history
informs the interpretation of a statute' 97-does not displace academic
benefit with inclusion. The House and Senate conference agreed that the
purpose of the Act was "to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them.., a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs." ' The Senate Report quoted Brown v. Board of
Education: "In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied an opportunity of an education.
Such the opportunity... is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms."199 But the Report did not indicate that this
pronouncement meant full inclusion for all disabled students. In fact, the
Senate Report also cited Mills v. Board of Education2 ° with approval in
the next sentence, noting that the Mills court ordered that "no child
eligible for a publicly supported education... shall be excluded from a
regular public school assignment... unless such child is provided:
(a) adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs,
which may include special education.... "20I The Report observed that
"proper education services" would enable many disabled children to
become productive citizens instead of a burden to society.2 2
Neither the statutory language nor its legislative history requires that
the placement of the disabled child should subve:rt that child's
195. 300 C.F.R. § 300.551(b)(1).
196. Board ofEduc. v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994); see also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1985) (stating that IDEA "requires an
'appropriate' education, not one that is equal in all respects to the education of nonretarded children;
clearly, admission to a class that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be
appropriate").
197. See generally Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank and Trust Co., 115 S. Ct. 637, 645-46
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our opinions using legislative history are often curiously
casual .... Perhaps that is because legislative history is in any event a make-weight; the Court really
makes up its mind on the basis of other factors.").
198. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, at 29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1482.
199. S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430 (quoting
Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
200. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). For a description of Mills and its influence on the passage
of IDEA, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
201. S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 13-14 (quoting Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 872).
202. Id. at 18.
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educational progress. "By denying these children a basic education, we
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions,
and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our Nation."2 3 It is simply not
appropriate to educate or instruct a disabled child in a setting where the
child "cannot flourish academically,"2" especially if another setting is
"academically superior."'2 5 To claim otherwise destroys the mission of
the public schools.
The primary purpose of the public schools must be the academic
training of students-preparing the young for life as an adult "in our
increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our
democratic Republic."2' This preparation-the pedagogical mission of
the schools-involves the transfer from one generation to the next of the
knowledge and values that are important for the individual citizen and
for the preservation of a democratic society. It includes both the transfer
of certain bases of knowledge-for example, how to read and write-
and, incorporated within these intellectual exercises, the transfer of the
"fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility"' that are
"indispensable to the practice of self-government."
20 7
203. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (discussing denial of education to illegal alien
children).
204. See Daniel R.L. v. State Bd. OfEduc., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
205. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
206. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (pointing out "pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and
cultural heritage"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (recognizing role of public schools
in "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system").
207. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, New
Basic History of the United States 228 (1968)); see also id. at 683 (noting that inculcation of values
necessary to maintenance of democratic political system is "work of the schools") (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (emphasizing importance of public schools in preparing individuals for
citizenship); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 n.20 (noting that "public schools are an important socializing
institution"); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-79 (discussing importance of public schools in preparing
individuals for participation as citizens); Murray-Seegert, supra note 39, at 36 (explaining that
society depends on schools to transmit formal culture, such as history, politics, and literature, and
less formal elements, such as values and social behaviors); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court
Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 14 (1992)
[hereinafter Brown, De Jure Segregation) (stating that schools perform "important academic role" of
disseminating information, teaching basic academic skills, providing vocational skills and assisting
in cognitive development of children). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's recognition of the
function of values inculcation, see Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation,
Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of invidious Value Inculcation, 58 Gen.
Wash. L. Rev. 1105, 1117-20 (1990).
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The "ideal education,""2 ° or what I call a "serious education," 29 is
necessary so that when students reach maturity, they may participate
knowledgeably in democratic and economic institutions."'0 The ability to
participate knowledgeably in democratic and economic institutions as an
adult depends on "a wide range of intellectual and social
[competencies]."2 " A necessary, though often subtle, part of academic
training includes socialization through value inculcation. At a time
when other institutions that instill values in children--family, church,
community-have deteriorated, public schools shoulder more of the
weight of the important function of value inculcation." 3 To fulfill its
pedagogical mission, the public school must strive to ensure that every
child-both disabled and non-disabled-has the opportunity to
participate in a learning community where the transfer of knowledge and
the corresponding value transfer that goes with it can and will occur.
Yet many of the circuit courts addressing the education of disabled
children (without clear support from the language of the statute) have
elevated placement over academic progress." 4 An examination of the
opinions yields two reasons why these courts have been willing to
elevate education setting over educational progress. First, the courts have
been influenced by the language in the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Board of Education v. Rowley2"' and have subtly imported the standard
set by Rowley-an opinion that interpreted the meaning of appropriate
education-into their opinions interpreting appropriate integration.
Second, the courts have been willing to accept-without rigorous
analysis-the premises set forth by the full inclusion advocates." 6 In the
208. Robert Maynard Hutchins, A Conversation on Education 1 (1963) (An "ideal education is
not an ad hoc education .... [I]t is an education calculated to develop the mind.").
209. Dupre, supra note 25, at 97; see also Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan
Democracy, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1697 (1990) ("The extent to which we take the commitment to
democracy seriously is measured by the extent we take the commitment to education seriously.").
210. See Dupre, supra note 25, at 98. "'[I]f free speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must have
something worth saying, together with the maturity and the skill needed to say it."' Id. at 97 (quoting
Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Author4t,: Public Schools as
Mediating Structures, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 663, 685-86 (1987) (citation omitted)); siee also Sherry, supra
note 28, at 132 (discussing claim that "education is necessary to the thoughtful or responsible
exercise of citizenship rights").
211. Richard Weissbourd, The Feel-Good Trap, New Republic, Aug. 19 & 26, 1996, at 12.
212. Cf. Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 13 (stating thal. two most important
functions of public schools are value inculcation and academic training).
213. See Dayton & Glickman, supra note 29, at 63.
214. See supra Part II.D.1.
215. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
216. See McCarthy, supra note 91, at 826-27.
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next part, I explain why it is wrong to import the Rowley standard into
the inclusion analysis. Immediately following, in Part IV, I examine the
questionable premises upon which the full inclusion movement rests.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's View
In an ideal world with unlimited resources, each child would be placed
in a learning community in a public school where the transfer of
knowledge would occur at the optimum level. This world with unlimited
resources might have a one-to-one student-teacher ratio or even three
teachers per student. In the real world where resources are limited,
however, educators must make rationing trade-offs regarding the
community of learning. For most students, the method used for
knowledge transfer--considering the resources available-is in a
classroom with twenty-five or so students, directed by a teacher.
Disabled children, who-unlike nondisabled students-are entitled by
statute to a free appropriate education, may challenge whether the
community of learning in which they are placed is appropriate.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether Congress intended free
appropriate education to mean that the public school must maximize the
potential of every disabled child. The Court held that Congress did not so
intend."' Rather, the Act was intended to open the door of public
education-to provide a "basic floor of opportunity," that is, "access to
specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the [disabled] child."2 8 Thus,
once it determines that the procedures of IDEA have been followed, a
reviewing court need only ask if the education provided is "reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits."2"9 If so, a
school has met its statutory obligation to provide a free appropriate
education. The Court in Rowley therefore did not require the school to
maximize the potential of a deaf girl, who was making good academic
progress in the regular classroom with a hearing aid and other special
services, by providing her with a special sign-language interpreter."
A determination that the school was obligated to maximize the
academic potential of every disabled student would have further
exacerbated the gap between the two classes of students in the public
217. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
218. Id. at 201.
219. Id. at 207.
220. Id. at 176-78.
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schools-the disabled student, who is statutorily enttled to a free
appropriate education with all the resources needed to fulfill that
entitlement, and the nondisabled student, who is not so entitled. And
although it may seem harsh to assert that public schools do not have the
duty to maximize the academic potential of its students, the lack of
resources to do so requires this limitation. Indeed, it would be untenable
to assert that some students are entitled to this extraordinary benefit,
while others are not."
Sometimes educators, when assessing whether the education program
will meet the unique needs of the individual disabled child as required by
statute, determine that the transfer of knowledge can best take place in a
separate classroom.' It is here where the public school--even if it is
attempting to maximize the academic potential of the disabled student-
runs up against the baffling tension present in IDEA: the "free
appropriate public education"' requirement versus the requirement of
integration "to the maximum extent appropriate."224 And it is here where
the courts have subtly-perhaps unwittingly-imported the principles set
forth in Rowley into the inclusion context.'
In Rowley, the parents of a deaf child requested additional services for
the child in the regular classroom, claiming that the child needed these
additional services to obtain an appropriate education. The Rowley
opinion did not deal with inclusion to the maximum extent appropriate,
as Amy Rowley was already included in a regular classroom. 6 Although
some courts addressing inclusion have purported to distinguish
Rowley, 7 they nonetheless have brought into the inclusion opinions
221. See Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1988)
("However desirable the goal of maximizing each child's potential may be in terms of
individuals ... achieving such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and local
governments.").
222. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (1994).
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994).
224. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
225. Although courts addressing the inclusion issue attempt to distinguisb the Rowley inquiry
from inclusion, the essence of Rowley seems to creep back into the opinic.ns. For example, in
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), the court stated that whether a disabled
child's education is "appropriate" is different from the inclusion issue. However, the court later
explained that the factor that makes a general classroom "feasible" is wheth-.r the disabled child
would "benefit" from mainstreaming. Id. at 1063.
226. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
227. See, e.g., Daniel R.R v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that
Rowley test is limited and does not advance court's inquiry regarding inclusion); Roncker, 700 F.2d
at 1062 (noting that "case differs from Rowley in two significant ways").
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some sense from Rowley that placement in the regular classroom is
appropriate under the statute as long as the disabled child obtains "some"
benefits. 8 These courts have never stated that a disabled child must be
included in a regular classroom if the child receives no benefit
whatsoever. Instead, these courts believe that the child will obtain some
kind of social benefit-like modeling or increased self-esteem-in the
general education classroom. 9 Under the standards set forth by these
courts of appeals, once that minimum benefit "floor"' is reached, even
the claim that the disabled child would make greater academic progress
in a special classroom does not mean that inclusion would be
inappropriate. Thus, under the feasibility standard adopted by the Sixth
Circuit" and the factors adopted by the Fifhfia 2 and the Ninth Circuits, 3
obtaining some benefit in the general education classroom is enough.
This is exactly what the Court held in Rowley when the parents of a
deaf child claimed the school was not giving her additional services-
services that would allow her to maximize her potential. The school is
not required to do more than institute a program that is "sufficient to
confer some educational benefit.""n4 For Amy Rowley, a hearing aid in
228. See, e.g., Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063 ("Some handicapped children simply must be educated
in segregated facilities.., because the handicapped child would not benefit from
mainstreaming... :).
229. See, e.g., Oberti v. Board of Educ. 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing
importance of "unique benefits" obtained from inclusion like "the development of social and
communication skills from interaction with nondisabled peers"); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688, 697 (llth Cir. 1991) (claiming that language and role modeling from association with
nondisabled peers are essential benefits of inclusion); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-49 (stating that
"the language and behavior models available from nonhandicapped children may be essential or
helpful to the handicapped child's development"); Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 882
(E.D. Cal. 1992) (noting benefits of social and communication skills and increased self-esteem),
aff'd sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); cf
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1065 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting argument that disabled boy must be
provided program within regular school environment "even if the only benefit from such placement
is to avoid the stigma of attending special school").
230. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
231. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
232. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-50.
233. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404.
234. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. Some courts have interpreted free appropriate education after
Rowley to mean that a disabled child must obtain more than mere de minimis educational benefit.
See, e.g., Doe v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 665 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that program
offered to disabled student provided more than de minimis educational benefits); Polk v. Central
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring meaningful benefit).
Yet these same courts have set standards for inclusion that would allow a child to be placed in a
general education classroom even if the child would achieve more academically under a special
program. See supra Part lI.D.1.
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the regular classroom was all the school was required to provide because
it was part of a program from which she obtained some benefit."5
Thus, the Rowley Court determined that Congress did not require state
and local agencies to maximize the potential of each disabled child. The
Third Circuit has also recognized that "[h]owever desirable the goal of
maximizing each child's potential may be in terms of individuals...
achieving such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and
local governments. ''u But surely Congress did not intend for the statute
to be a bar for schools who wish to do more to ensure the academic
progress of a disabled child by providing for the child's unique needs in
a special classroom that is academically superior for the child. 7 And the
Supreme Court has cautioned the courts against reviewing matters of
educational methodology, noting that courts are not competent to resolve
such "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy" and that
Congress did not intend judicial review to stretch that far into the
schools."
Obtaining a "serious education" for the disabled child may perhaps be
the ultimate liberation-it may be the difference between a life of
dependence on the nondisabled for support and sustenance and a more
independent and self-reliant existence." An educational setting where
the child will make greater academic progress is more likely to lead to
self-sufficiency than a setting where a child "may be able to absorb only
a minimal amount of the regular education program."24 The unflagging
insistence that academic achievement is somehow less important for the
disabled child in relation to the goal of inclusion treats the disabled child
differently from the nondisabled child in a matter of ultimate importance.
Even if schools are not statutorily obligated to maxinize the academic
potential of disabled students, this does not mean that schools should not
strive to do so, within the means of their limited resources. Given its
235. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184,209-10.
236. Polk, 853 F.2d. at 178-79.
237. See Wilson v. Marana Unified Sh. Dist. No. 6, 735 F.2d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 1984)
(deciding that although IDEA does not require states to provide disabled children with best
education possible, this does not mean that states do not have power to provide disabled children
with education which they consider more appropriate than that proposed by parents). But see
Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 757 F. Supp. 606, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
('U]nder Rowley mainstreaming is one indication of whether a handicapped child is receiving
adequate benefits from his or her education.").
238. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973)).
239. See id. at 205 n.23 (noting Congress's concern for self-sufficiency).
240. Daniel RL.L v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
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pedagogical mission, the public school must attempt to create a
community of learning where the transfer of knowledge for all students
can and will occur, and where every student reaches his or her
potential.24'
IV. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT
UNDERLIE THE INCLUSION MOVEMENT
In addition to the subtle importation of the Rowley benefit principle
into the inclusion analysis, the courts' subordination of tangible
academic benefit to intangible nonacademic benefits indicates that some
courts-at least implicitly-accept the underlying premises of the full
inclusion advocates-that separation because of difference is harmful
and that the harm can be cured by exposure to children who are of the
mainstream. According to the full inclusion advocates, exposure to
nondisabled children helps to cure the harm created by separation in
24various ways. 42 Although some advocates simply assert that inclusion is
morally and ethically the "right thing to do," the underlying presumption
is that separation stigmatizes and causes the separated child to feel
inferior because the child is different. 3 Including the child in a general
education classroom with nondisabled students is viewed as a means to
increase the child's self-esteem.2' Greater self-esteem, in turn, may be
presumed to lead to greater academic achievement.245
Besides curing the stigma caused by separation, full inclusion
advocates also believe that inclusion helps to cure that which caused the
241. See infra Part V.
242. See, e.g., Kotler, supra note 37, at 358 n.102 ("Just as a sick child is given medical attention
and then sent back to school to join his or her classmates, whenever possible the disabled child
should receive highly intensive intervention and then join (or rejoin) the group.").
243. See Hocutt et al., supra note 99, at 23 (noting issue of stigma associated with students
separated from their peers); Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 7 (noting belief that all special
classes represent unethical treatment because separation from mainstream is always demeaning,
whereas being with majority is always self-enhancing); Kotler, supra note 37, at 366 (describing
goal of IDEA as integration to promote dignity of child).
244. See Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that "child
may be better able to learn academic subjects because of improved self-esteem and increased
motivation due to placement in regular education"), aff'd sub noma. Sacramento City Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Although the Holland court accepted this
proposition explicitly, it is also implied in other opinions. See, e.g., Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d
1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting argument that special education
program must be provided within regular school environment "even if the only benefit.., is to avoid
the stigma of attending a special school").
245. See Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 879.
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child to be viewed as different in the first place. In short, disabled
children should use nondisabled children as models to help cure their
deficiencies.246
The next section examines the premise that separation because of
difference is stigmatizing. It then analyzes the claim that inclusion cures
the stigma of inferiority that stems from segregation and thereby
increases self-esteem and achievement. This claim deserves closer study,
given the serious questions that are being raised about the self-esteem
movement in the public schools.
A. Assessing the Curative Value ofInclusion
1. Stigma and Self-Esteem
The notion that separation because of difference must always be
stigmatizing does not withstand close examination. Students who are
segregated into special classes for those who are deemed gifted and those
who are separated for special academic classes in, for example, science
or music are not stigmatized. Indeed, school districts are praised when
they create special schools-magnet schools-that separate out students
because of their talent in foreign languages, mathematiets, science, or the
arts.247 Members of the U.S. Wheelchair Basketball Team in the 1996
Paralympics were not stigmatized because they were separated-because
of difference-from the Dream Team. 248
246. See, e.g., Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist, 950 F.2d 688, 692 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting concern
of psychologist hired by parents that disabled child will not have peer models to imitate in self-
contained special education class); id. at 697 (stating that even if disabled child makes academic
progress more quickly in self-contained special education class, such progress might not justify
placement in that environment "if the child would receive considerable nonacrademic benefit, such as
language and role modeling, from association with his or her nonhandicapped peers"); see also
Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8 (pointing out that modeling is "common argument" of
inclusion advocates).
247. See Thomas Toch et al., Schools That Work; U.S. News & World Rep., May 27, 1991, at 58;
ef. Hueflier, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that Learning Disabilities Association of America and some
educators of the deaf do not support full inclusion).
248. See Seth Coleman, Paralympic Games, Atlanta Const., Aug. 25, 1996, at 13E. A Team USA
member described the bronze medal game crowd as "the loudest crowd I've ever played in front
of-even louder than in Barcelona. They made the difference tonight.... They reacted to
everything we did, and the whole team fed off that" Id.; see also Richard Hoffer, Ready, Willing and
Able; They Don't Want Pity or Teary Tributes, Sports Ill., Aug. 14, 1995, at 67 ("Disabled athletes
hope that what they do will be revealed as sport- the kind of rigorous and cut-throat activity that fans
pay to watch, and kids want to try."); id. at 69 (describing ESPN prograra Break Away, which
features sports for disabled, and magazines like Sports 'n Spokes and Palaesv'ra that "treat disabled
athletes as authentic sports figures").
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Thus, it is not necessarily the separation, but the meaning behind the
separation that stigmatizes the separated students. 249 If students are
separated because they are viewed as inferior or unworthy, then they are
stigmatized as being inferior and unworthy. But not all separation
because of different abilities can be attributed to the invidious belief that
the difference makes the individual inferior or unworthy.' 0 Separation
that places an individual with a disability in a setting where that
individual can flourish-whether on the wheelchair basketball court or a
special education classroom-may simply be based on the individual's
unique needs. Instead of assuming that all separation because of
disability is invidious, "discovering the intent of school officials seems to
be the best method for determining the message attached to certain
administrative rules used by public schools" and for "determin[ing] the
values being inculcated by such rules in public schools."'
During parts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the
disabled were excluded by law from all educational opportunity, it was
apparent that the meaning behind separating the disabled from the
nondisabled was a belief in the inherent inferiority of the disabled. 1 2 The
full inclusion advocates (and the courts that have accepted their
arguments) have assumed without question that-despite the demise of
de jure segregation-the de facto segregation of disabled students
inevitably stems from the invidious belief that the disabled are inferior.
Although it is possible that, in some instances, segregation of disabled
students may stem from an improper motive, the segregation of a
disabled child in a separate classroom may also be motivated by "sound
educational justification'" ' or "legitimate school concerns" 4 instead of
249. See Kauff-man & Pullen, supra note 176, at 11 ("The real issues are the meanings we attach
to disabilities, not the fact that we label them."); cf. Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207,
at 14 ("Establishing invidious intent is tantamount to proving that the meaning attached to the
separation of blacks and whites in schools was a belief in the inferiority of African-Americans.").
250. See Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 11 (stating that not all racial separation
in schools should be attributed to "invidious value" of racial inferiority).
251. Idl at 14 n.45; ef. Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 107, at 108-10, 137-39,
144-45 (claiming that rights analysis as applied to disabled contains contradictions when one strand
emphasizes "sameness" between disabled and nondisabled and one strand emphasizes
"difference"--that certain entitlements are required because of special needs of disabled).
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,731 (1992). In Fordice, the Court addressed whether
the State of Mississippi had taken the requisite affirmative steps to dismantle its prior de jure
segregated system in light of its policies regarding historically black and historically white
institutions of higher learning. The Court stated that if a State perpetuates policies that continue to
have a segregative effect and if "such policies are without sound educational justification and can be
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illegitimate notions of inferiority."5 Researchers who have visited
various school sites to study inclusion have noted that they observed
"very little 'specially designed instruction' [for the disabled] in the
regular classroom." 6 In fact, these researchers "saw almost no specific,
directed, individualized, intensive, remedial instruction" in the regular
classroom for the disabled students, "who were clearly deficient
academically and struggling with the school-work they were being
given."" Moreover, it is difficult to see how being placed in a situation
where the disabled child cannot succeed and fairly compete with peers
will help their self-esteem. Without individualized, intensive remedial
instruction for the disabled child included in the general education
classroom-a goal that may prove impossible, given the limits on teacher
time and financial resources' s -the disabled child may indeed receive
superior academic training in a special classroom. In a special classroom
the disabled child may better obtain training that meets the child's unique
needs," 9 training that may eventually lead to greater academic
achievement and greater preparation for adult life.2" Thus, although
practically eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior
system." Id. (emphasis added).
254. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Court determined that absent "substantial disruption" or "material interference" with
the education process, the school cannot restrain student expression. Id. at 514. Justice Harlan would
have allowed school officials "the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their
institutions." Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[I-Ie assumed that the teach .r-who is trained and
experienced in the pedagogical needs of students-would act in the best or 'legitimate' interests of
the students unless the student could show otherwise." Dupre, supra note 25, at 102; see also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (stating that school principal has
power to control student speech in school-sponsored newspaper if restraint is "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns"). For an argument that a new definition of school power lies within
Justice Harlan's dissent in Tinker, see Dupre, supra note 25, at 102-03.
255. Although de jure segregation by race clearly was designed to perpetaate the assumption of
inferiority, courts determined that the meaning behind de facto segregation--separation that occurs
in fact, but is not pursuant to statute-could be ascertained only by focusing on the intent of the
school officials. See Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 13.
256. Baker & Zigmond, supra note 18, at 178.
257. Id.; see also James M. Kauffman, How We Might Achieve the Rad'cal Reform of Special
Education, 60 Exceptional Children 6, 8 (1993) (citing recent empirical studies that indicate that we
do not "currently have effective and reliable strategies for improving and sustaining outcomes for all
students in regular classrooms").
258. See infra Part V.A-B.
259. Cf. Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 107, at 37-19 (stating that better
educational opportunity may be available for some students in specialized setting rather than in
general education classroom).
260. See Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 6 (stating that disabled st..dent must be placed in
environment where student can meet objective of IEP "without endangering self or others, and this
environment almost certainly will not be the general education classroom for all students").
Disability and the Public Schools
compelled separation to perpetuate a belief in inferiority is "an insult and
an act of domination," separation to obtain superior academic training
and to better meet a disabled child's needs may "reflect pride and a
commitment to group self-determination. 26'
In addition to the superior academic training motive for special
classes, there may be evidence that the disabled child would disrupt the
learning community or take up a disproportionate amount of the
teacher's time and the school's limited resources in the general education
classroom so that other children will be unable to achieve
academically.262 If the segregation is not the result of the invidious belief
that the disabled child is inferior but stems from another legitimate
pedagogical motive, the meaning behind the separation is not the
inferiority of the disabled, but respect for academic achievement in the
community of learning within the public school institution.26 Thus, any
stigma that may result-if a stigma does indeed result-is not necessarily
a result of the separation itself.
2
"
If a disabled child is stigmatized when the child is educated in a
special classroom, it may not be because of the separation itself, but a
result of deeply ingrained social attitudes about people who are disabled.
The full inclusion advocates assert that placing disabled children in a
regular classroom with nondisabled children would help to change some
of these deeply ingrained social attitudes. 2' By exposing nondisabled
children to disabled children, they argue, the nondisabled children would
261. Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Separate and Still Unequal, 36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 685, 689
n.24 (1995) (citing Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728,746 (1986)).
262. See infra Part V.A-B.
263. See James M. Kauffman, The Regular Education Initiative as Reagan-Bush Education
Policy: A Trickle-Down Theory of Education of the Hard-To-Teach, 23 J. Special Educ. 256, 262
(1989) ("[S]eparateness may be required for equality of opportunity when separation is based on
criteria directly related to teaching and learning.. .).
264. Cf. Kauffman, supra note 257, at 8 (pointing out that "studies of the social status of children
with disabilities do not show that the stigma and isolation they feel is necessarily a result of their
being taught outside the regular classroom").
265. See Daniel P. Hallahan & James M. Kauffman, Toward a Culture of Disability in the
Aftermath of Deno and Dunn, 27 J. Special Educ. 496, 506 (1994) ("[Radical inclusionists"
presume that "perceptions are so colored by where instruction takes place that they induce an
inability to recognize a person's worth and individuality as separate from where they are educated.");
see also Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.24 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting "reciprocal
benefits of inclusion to the nondisabled students in the class" when they learn to work and
communicate with disabled students). Of course, inappropriately placing a child in a regular
classroom may only serve to reinforce negative perceptions when the child cannot conform to the
social norms there because of, for example, severe behavior problems.
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learn that disability should neither be feared nor reviled.2" In essence,
inclusion would help to cure nondisabled students of their narrow-
minded beliefs at the same time it cures the disabled child. This argument
has some force, and there are indeed many disabled children who can
and do achieve in the regular classroom, without hindering the academic
progress of other students, and who may also teach some of their fellow
students important lessons about tolerance. These children should
certainly be included. But however important these lessons may be, they
cannot subsume the primary purpose of the public school as an
institution-to create a learning community for the transfer of knowledge
where each student can and will obtain a serious education. Rather than
forcing the disabled child to try to be "cured" and to be more "normal"
by being included in the general education classroom, a better goal to
strive for is "acceptance of people with disabilities regardless of where
they receive their instruction."'267
The value of self-esteem has been acclaimed in recent years as the
solution for many of the problems plaguing children in the public
schools.26 The upshot for the public schools has been an emphasis on
inculcating "intangible" sentiments like self-esteem, rather than stressing
"tangible" academic achievement as a means towards self-esteem or even
as an end unto itself.269 Following this trend, increased self-esteem has
been one of the rationales used by the disability inclusio-nists and then by
the courts to elevate integration over education for students with
disabilities.270
266. See generally Susan Stainback & William Stainback, Integration of Students with Severe
Handicaps into Regular Schools 8-10 (1985).
267. Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note 265, at 506; see also James M. Kauffman & Daniel P.
Hallahan, Toward a Comprehensive Delivery System for Special Education, in The Illusion of Full
Inclusion, supra note 92, at 157, 166-67 (noting need to balance focus on changing disabled person
so as to be more normal with focus on changing society to accept people who have disabilities).
268. See, e.g., Charles J. Sykes, Dumbing Down Our Kids 48-49 (1995) (noting that in 1990s
many educators believe that self-esteem has "almost limitless application," including "inoculat[ing]
us against the lures of crime, violence, substance abuse, teen pregnancy, child abuse, chronic welfare
dependency and educational failure").
269. Weissbourd, supra note 211, at 12. "[Miany Americans place a higher priority on life
adjustment and the enhancement of self-esteem than on academic learning." Harold W. Stevenson &
James W. Stigler, The Learning Gap 111 (1992); see also Sykes, supra note 268, at 49 (noting how
inflating self-image is part of therapeutic mindset that underlies hostility to intellectualism of
traditional education).
270. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that
self-esteem from being placed in regular classroom is likely to increase academic achievement),
aff'd sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994);
National Sch. Pub. Relations Ass'n, supra note 2, at 88 (quoting Educational Facilities Laboratory
Report stating that pride is most important scholastic achievement for retarded students).
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But the self-esteem movement has been increasingly viewed as "not
just useless but dangerous. 27' First, "there is little empirical evidence
that American students suffer from a crisis of self-esteem."2 72 In fact,
some studies suggest that American students feel better about themselves
than their abilities warant. 73 Moreover, researchers are concluding that
there is little "if any evidence that children's academic performance is
causally determined by their global self-concept."274 Most notably,
although low self-esteem has been proposed as a cause of criminal
behavior 27' as well as low academic performance, some studies show that
violent criminals have high self-esteem.276 Indeed, the increased violence
271. Weissbourd, supra note 211, at 12.
272. Sykes, supra note 268, at 49.
273. Id. (pointing out that American students rankfirst when asked how they feel about their math
abilities, but actually rank last in international comparisons of math abilities).
274. Thomas G. Moeller, Self-Esteem: How Important Is It to Improving Academic
Performance?, Va J. Educ., Nov. 1993, at 7, 11; see also Martin V. Covington, Self-Esteem and
Failure in School: Analysis and Policy Implications in The Social Importance of Self-Esteem 72, 79
(Andrew M. Mecca et al. eds., 1989) (describing and citing studies that show generally low
magnitude of association between self-esteem and achievement, with one study showing that 97% of
variation in academic performance can be explained other than by self-concept); Sykes, supra note
268, at 53-54 (noting that although there is correlation between students with high academic
achievement and high self-esteem, there is no evidence that one causes other); Weissbourd, supra
note 211, at 12 (pointing out that host of studies show that "the very premise that greater self-esteem
will boost academic achievement is simply wrong" and that "[s]elf-esteem has little or no impact on
academic achievement, or on drug use violence or on any other serious problems"). Moreover,
researchers that have tried to demonstrate that changes in self-concept lead to improved performance
have reached contradictory results and the effects of the manipulation are short-lived. See Covington,
supra at 79-80.
In addition to the lack of evidence that high self-esteem causes high academic performance,
researchers have similarly concluded that "it will be very difficult indeed to identify a causal link
between self-esteem and teenage pregnancy." Susan B. Crockenberg & Barbara A. Soby, Self-
Esteem and Teenage Pregnancy, in The Social Importance of Self-Esteem, supra, at 125, 135.
Although some research links low self-esteem to adolescent pregnancy, "these results do not
necessarily demonstrate that low self-esteem increases the risk of pregnancy during adolescence." Id.
at 145-46. In fact, researchers reviewing studies that examined the association between self-esteem
and teenage pregnancy determined that, although low self-esteem "does contribute to the risk of an
adolescent pregnancy... the association between low self-esteem and pregnancy is not strong." Id.
at 149. These researchers "would not expect raising self-esteem to have a major impact on
adolescent sexual behavior," although some data, "though imperfect," has led them to be hopeful
that raising self-esteem might result in increased contraceptive use. Id. at 150. Factors other than
self-esteem that affect the teen pregnancy rate are race or ethnicity, social class, age, availability of
contraceptives, and the historical period during which the adolescent reached childbearing age. Id at
132.
275. Thomas J. Scheff et al., Crime, Violence and Self-Esteem: Review and Proposals, in The
Social Importance of Self-Esteem, supra note 274, at 165, 166.
276. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression:
The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem, 103 Psychological Rev. 5, 15-25 (1996) (examining patterns of
self-esteem in individuals who have committed murder and assault, rape, or domestic violence, or
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in schools may stem, not from low self-esteem, but from self-esteem that
is so high that the student cannot abide by what the student sees as an act
of disrespect.
277
The alternative to the emphasis on self-concept is not neglecting or
mistreating children. Rather, it is helping to instill the confidence that
grows by overcoming challenges. 27" Disabled and nondisabled children
alike can develop this kind of confidence built on achievement. On the
other hand, children who are praised and rewarded merely in a misguided
attempt to increase their self-worth-rather than for any kind of
accomplishment-may learn to distrust the judgment of adults and to
doubt their own abilities. Not allowing students to learn to cope with
criticism or the disappointment that comes with failure is a major
disservice to the child.2
79
One goal of IDEA is to help disabled children become productive
members of society.20 For many students this includes devising an IEP
that sets academic standards geared towards obtaining skills that will
enable them as adults to enter the workforce in some capacity.281' To
impart a serious education to these disabled students, educators must be
able to set standards and then have the confidence to be judgmental about
whether a student has reached that standard or not. Students who enter
the twenty-first century's workforce thinking that their self-esteem is
paramount to achievement on the job and who are not equipped to deal
who have been involved in political terror, oppression, or genocide). But compare Scheff et al.,
supra note 275, at 170 (citing one study that proposed that delinquent behavior serves to enhance
self-esteem for individuals who have experienced failure and lowered self-esteem) with id. at 177
(stating that "the vast body of quantitative studies does not establish level of self-esteem as a cause
of crime and violence").
277. See Weissbourd, supra note 211, at 12. "Violent youths seem sincerely to believe that they
are better than other people, but they frequently find themselves in circumstances that threaten or
challenge these beliefs, and in those circumstances they tend to attack other people." Baumeister
et al., supra note 276, at 22. "It also appears that they sometimes manipulate or seek out such
challenges to their esteem, in order to enhance their esteem by prevailing in a violent contest." Id.
Studies addressing the relationship between self-esteem and welfare dependency have determined
that "although cross-sectional studies might lean toward positing a relationship between low self-
esteem and [welfare] dependency, the longitudinal data generally negate the observed finding."
Leonard Schneiderman et al., Self-Esteem and Chronic Welfare Dependency, in The Social
Importance of Self-Esteem, supra note 274, at 200, 233.
278. See Sykes, supra note 268, at 57.
279. "Children who learn to lose without being devastated and use failure experiences to grow
will achieve in the classroom and in society. Learning to compete effectively is central to
achievement in our schools." Sylvia B. Rimm, Underachievement Syndrome Causes and Cures 4
(1986).
280. Board ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982).
281. Of course the standards will vary depending on the disability involved.
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with criticism will be unable to cope in a competitive multi-national
market.28
2
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding self-esteem, even if
increased self-esteem is somehow desirable for disabled students, it is not
clear that inclusion would increase self-esteem for many disabled
children. Attending a special class may be less stigmatizing and less
destructive of self-esteem for some disabled students than struggling in a
general education classroom where they are constantly comparing
themselves to nondisabled students. 23 Being part of a special class in
which their unique instructional needs are met may be self-enhancing for
disabled children.2s Indeed, for some children, inclusion may exacerbate
the stigma that inclusionists hope to eradicate.2 5
One message that arises from the inclusion movement is that the
preferred method for disabled children to feel better about themselves is
to sit next to nondisabled children. This contributes to a "self-fulfilling
prophecy, in which students begin to feel stigmatized because we
describe special classes as undesirable and general education classes as
282. See Rimm, supra note 279, at 4 ("It is not possible to be productive in our society or in our
schools until one learns to deal with competition, and dealing with competition means coping with
losing in a productive way.").
283. See Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 7; see also Joanne Greenberg & Glenn Doolittle,
Can Schools Speak the Language of the DeaP, N.Y. Times Mag., Dec. 11, 1977, at 50 (reporting
isolation in class when child is "different" and others are seen as "normal" more damaging than
stigma of separation); Joseph R. Jenkins & Amy Heinen, Students' Preferences for Service Delivery:
Pull-out, In-class or Integrated Models, 55 Exceptional Children 516, 519-20 (1989) (noting that
interviews with children suggest that many feel more stigmatized when they are given special help in
general education classrooms than when they are pulled out for special help in separate classrooms).
For instance, a child who is performing four levels below the other students in the class as a result of
her disability will at some point realize that she is not doing the same things nor is she able to do the
same things that the other children are doing. Children often care very deeply about whether they are
conforming to what others are doing. They may become angry and frustrated, or they may just
withdraw quietly from any real effort to keep up with the others. Those of us who have taken a class
where others have abilities far superior to ours may have experienced a mild version of this.
284. See Kauffinan & Pullen, supra note 176, at 7-8 (explaining how disabled child lost
motivation in general classroom and regained it in special class). A school attorney who handled the
Greer case for the school district before the Eleventh Circuit, see Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688, 695 (1 1th Cir. 1991), visited the general education classroom where Christy Greer, now in
middle school, is presently included. Interview with Sam Harben, attorney, Harben & Hartley, in
Athens, Ga. (Feb. 26, 1997) (on file with author). According to Mr. Harben, Christy has withdrawn
from the rest of the class, sits off by herself, and has little, if any, contact with other students. When
Mr. Harben visited the special class in which Christy would have been placed, he stated that the
students were happy and excited as they worked together to prepare for Parents' Day. Id.
285. Cf. Brown, DeJure Segregation, supra note 207, at 67 (stating that while "segregation in the
past stood as a symbol of the inferiority of African-Americans, the remedies for de jure
segregation... merely replicate the disease.").
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better or preferable for everyone. ' 28 6 If the disabled child has increased
self-esteem only because he is allowed to sit in the same classroom as his
nondisabled peers, then we have allowed society to construct a wall of
inferiority around the disabled students. Most disturbingly, we have used
the school-an institution that should be stressing the virtues of
academic achievement-to deny "the possibility that a positive self-
identity can be fostered by associating with others who share one's
exceptionality., 287 Instead of recognizing and accepting the difference-
the exceptionality-that is disability, the disabled and nondisabled alike
receive the signal that there is something "wrong" with being disabled
that can only be cured by being with and being more like nondisabled
children.2"' This sets an impossible task before some disabled children,
because some disabled children simply can never be like nondisabled
children. It fails to allow for the development of pride in difference and
stifles the belief that separation because of difference: is just that-
because of difference and not because of inferiority.
2. Modeling
In addition to increasing self-esteem and avoiding stigma, the courts
have also latched onto another "common argument" 289 of the inclusion
advocates: when in a regular classroom, the disabled children can use the
nondisabled children as models to help cure their deficiencies g.2 ' The
courts that have accepted this premise allude to no evidence that this is
286. See Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 7.
287. Id. (citation omitted); see also Eric Minton, What a Sport! Wheelchair Sports Are Becoming
More Popular, 10 Indep. Living Provider 52 (1995) (quoting wheelchair basketball player describing
camaraderie from wheelchair athletics and importance of"being with other people in my situation").
288. Cf. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma ofDifference: Bilingual and Special
Education, in Children With Special Needs 378 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Judith Welch Wegner eds.,
1987) (describing "difference dilemma" as either labeling student and focusing on disability-thus
risking stigma-or ignoring disability and risking stigma because majority practices are shaped
without regard for difference).
289. Kauffrman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8.
290. See, e.g., Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) "The court must pay
special attention to those unique benefits the child may obtain from integration in a regular
classroom which cannot be achieved in a segregated environment, i.e., the development of social and
communication skills from interaction with nondisabled peers."); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688, 692 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting concern of psychologist hired by parents that disabled child
will not have peer models to imitate in self-contained special education class); . at 697 (stating that
even determination that disabled child will make academic progress more quickly in self-contained
special education class might not justify placement in that environment "if the child would receive
considerable nonacademic benefit, such as language and role modeling from association with his or
her nonhandicapped peers).
826
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true and set forth no standard for how much modeling must take place
before the academic benefit to the disabled child is discounted to serve
the modeling function of inclusion. They also fail to acknowledge that
the modeling function may be sufficiently addressed when the disabled
child is included during art, music, physical education, lunch, and recess.
The assumption by the courts that modeling-or observational
learning-will improve the lot of the disabled student is open to
question. "The mechanisms of peer influence, including observational
learning, are not simple; the effects of peer models are highly dependent
upon their social context, and models are but one factor among many
influences on social status and social conduct .... ,,291 Disabled students
do not spontaneously imitate the appropriate behavior of nondisabled
students.292 Indeed, observing the behavior and reinforcement of a model
sometimes results in acceleration of behavior the opposite of that
exhibited by the model.293 Even when the behavior of children with
emotional or behavioral disorders improves after witnessing appropriate
behavior in nondisabled peer models, studies suggest that the effects are
temporary. 94
Perhaps most troubling is the fact that, where examined critically, the
modeling rationale itself is based in part on stereotypes about disabled
and nondisabled children: the special classroom contains disabled
students who will have both abnormal behavior and language patterns,
whereas the general education classroom contains "normal" students who
are well-behaved and adept at language skills. The underlying
assumption is that students with disabilities will have a primarily
negative influence on each other 295 and that "[s]tudents with disabilities
need to be alongside those who don't have disabilities, because the
291. Hallenbeck & Kauffman, supra note 18, at 46-47. "[Children need] instruction in what to
pay attention to, how to remember and rehearse modeled behavior, how to judge when and where to
produce imitative responses, as well as external and explicit motivation for appropriate imitation.
These instructional needs go well beyond the social curriculum offered in the typical classroom." Id.
at 61. But cf. Paul Sale & Doris M. Carey, The Sociometric Status of Students with Disabilities in a
Full-Inclusion School, 62 Exceptional Children 6, 7 (1995) (pointing out differing results in studies
of inclusion of children with severe disabilities, where one study showed social and communication
benefits and others showed social isolation in general classroom).
292. Hallenbeck & Kauffraan, supra note 18, at 63.
293. Id. at 57-58 (describing studies).
294. Id. at 59-61 (describing studies but noting some beneficial results for withdrawn children
and children with relatively good behavior).
295. "How will children learn to behave if they have only the 'horrid examples' provided by
others with disabilities?" Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8.
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normal ones know how to behave and will be good examples."296 Left
unexplained, however, is why the behavior of students in general
education classrooms sometimes deteriorates and why the disabled child
fails to imitate his or her peers' "appropriate behavior" before being
referred for a special class. In fact, "[i]t is quite unlikely that [the
disabled students] will display, by virtue of their being returned to
regular classes, skills that they did not show prior to being removed from
regular classes." '297
Despite these stereotypical assumptions, of course, nearly every
general education or special education classroom contains both desirable
and undesirable models.29 The full inclusion proponents and some courts
of appeals have assumed not only that observational learning will take
place, but also that what is learned will somehow have a positive
influence on the disabled child.2 But it is unclear to what degree
students with disabilities learn from appropriate peer models, and
students may learn from inappropriate models as well.3 ' Students with
emotional or behavioral disorders, for example, typically have
demonstrated their proclivity for imitating inappropriate peer models in
the general education class setting.0 1 Moreover, to be effective, the
observers must be able to identify with-to see something of themselves
in-the model. 2 The special classroom provides children with a
"reference group in which they may perceive their own capabilities
within a more favorable light."303 And models who are not already
competent in a skill, but who are acquiring it through persistent effort,
are more effective models for observers-like some disabled students-
who are not competent304 The proponents of full inclusion would deprive
disabled students of the opportunity to be role models for each other in
296. Id.
297. Hallenbeck & Kauffrnan, supra note 18, at 66.
298. See Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8.
299. See cases cited supra note 290.
300. Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8. ("[M]ost students with disabilities, like most other
students, seem to learn unpredictably from appropriate peer models in the absence of an explicit
imitation-training program.").
301. Hallenbeck & Kauffman, supra note 18, at 66.
302. Id. at 55 (describing studies); Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 8.
303. Coleman & Minnett, supra note 110, at 243. Some researchers claim that this comparison
group is beneficial to the self-esteem of disabled children, particularly those who are socially
rejected. Id. at 243-44; see also Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note 265, at 504 (suggesting that
persons with learning disabilities consider themselves part of learning disability culture, that they
embrace having learning disability as being part of their identity).
304. Hallenbeck & Kauffman, supra note 18, at 56.
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special classes and-as with the self-esteem rationale--deny that there is
a positive value that exists when those who share an exceptionality
associate with each other." 5 In the rush to full inclusion, "we risk
overlooking and discarding the discovery of identity, common will, and
support that comes from the opportunity to congregate with those
engaged in struggles that share characteristics of ability, culture, status,
or environment."3
0 6
This is not the first time that the courts considering segregation issues
have addressed the issue based on notions of stigma, self-esteem, and
modeling. Court opinions dealing with racial integration, beginning with
Brown v. Board of Education,37 have taken a similar path. Full inclusion
advocates claim that the Brown Court's statement that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal"3 ' means that separation of
disabled students in a special education classroom is unlawful and/or
unethical.0 9 In the next section, I examine this premise, and I consider
how some of the criticism of the racial school desegregation model-
with its adherence to integration as the primary goal in educating African
American students-relates to disability inclusion.
B. After Forty Years: The Curative Value and Racial Integration
The movement to achieve rights for the disabled has often been
compared to the civil rights movement for racial equality.10 Inclusion
305. See Thomas W. Farmer et al., The Social Behavior and Peer Relations of Emotionally and
Behaviorally Disturbed Children in Residential Treatment, I J. Emotional & Behavioral Disorders
223 (1993) (presenting research suggesting that children in well-taught, special education classes for
students with emotional or behavioral disorders can develop social affiliations that foster pro-social
behavior); Hallahan & Kauffrnan, supra note 265, at 505 (noting that among individuals with other
identifying differences--senior citizens, veterans of foreign wars, recovering alcoholics, parents of
children with specific disabilities-regular congregation is seen as vital part of identity and support).
Interestingly, many in the deaf community have been suspicious of the inclusion movement, and
some prefer separate settings or residential institutions. See H. Lane, Listen to the Needs of Deaf
Children, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1987, at A35. "In many ways, the deaf are proud of their deafness."
Hallahan & Kauffinan, supra note 265, at 503.
306. Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note 265, at 505 (quoting Eugene Edgar & Shepherd Siegel,
Postsecondary Scenarios for Troubled and Troubling Youth, in Issues in Educational Placement:
Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 274 (James M. Kauffman et a]. eds., 1995)).
307. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
308. Id. at 495.
309. Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 176, at 9.
310. See, e.g., Sage & Burello, supra note 20, at 39 (asserting that principles established in Brown
are applicable to "other discriminatory classifications," including classification of disabled); see also
Weber, supra note 2, at 393 (noting "powerful analogy to race cases").
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advocates claim that the exclusion of disabled children from all
educational services is similar to the exclusion of African American
children from white schools. Some have compared special education to
apartheid,"' and even to slavery.312 But, as explained below, although
some parallels exist when assessing the harm of exclusion, the analogy
fails when it comes to the remedy of inclusion.313 Moreover, the forty-
odd years since Brown was decided have allowed time for reflection
regarding some of the underlying beliefs that fueled the racial integration
movement in schools. Scholars have begun to examine -the premises of
the racial integration model in the public schools and to analyze its
effects on African American children and on African American
institutions. Some commentators and judges-with the acute vision of
hindsight-have sharply criticized the path that the courts took in the
racial integration cases,314 and groups that have fought for inclusion in
the past are now waging a fight for separate classrooms in the hope of
achieving greater academic success.3"5 Some African American leaders
Moreover, "the existence of a disproportionate number of minority childrei in [special] classes
opened them to critical scrutiny as pockets of segregation within schools." MacMillan et al., supra
note 102, at 470. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Compare Theresa
Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1237,
1243-44 (claiming that unconscious and structural racism is pervasive in special education system)
with Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 83, at 17 (pointing out possibility that factors other than racial
discrimination might account for disproportionate number of black children in special education
classes).
311. See, e.g., Dorothy K. Lipsky & Alan Gartner, Capable of Achievement and Worthy of
Respect: Education for Handicapped Children as if They Were Full-Fledged Human Beings,
54 Exceptional Children 69, 70 (1987) (citation omitted).
312. Susan Stainback & William Stainback, Letter to the Editor, 21 J. Learning Disabilities 452,
452-53 (1988).
313. But see Weber, supra note 2, at 393 n.233 (claiming that comparison between racial
segregation and disability segregation is precise "[w]hen mainstreaming is at issue").
314. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("After all,
if separation itself is a harm and if integration therefore is the only way that blacks can receive a
proper education, then there must be something inferior about blacks.").
315. See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the integrative Ideal, 26
Ariz. St. L.J. 535, 535 (1994) (pointing out argument by African Americans that historically black
public colleges and universities should be preserved); Joshua E. Kimerling, Comment, Black Male
Academies: Re-Examining the Strategy of Integration, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 829 (1994) (noting that as
result of persistent educational achievement disparities between black and white American students,
educators are proposing and implementing creation of all-black, male public azademies); Anemona
Hartocollis, Groups: Get All-Girls School Off A-Gender, N.Y. Daily News, July 16, 1996, at 14
(discussing how philanthropist Ann Rubenstein Tisch hopes to establish all-girls public school in
East Harlem because statistics show that "top schools in England are single-sex and that girls do
better in science and math when they are apart from boys"); David Sadker & Jacqueline Sadker,
Separate--But Still Short-Changed, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1995, at A19 (disc:ussing research that
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stress that there is no evidence that blacks must attend school with whites
to learn,31 6 and both "African American advocates and parents have
indicated a willingness to forego racial balance in favor of effective
education when the two seem incompatible."3 "1
Racial desegregation, similar to disability inclusion, was thought to
enhance academic achievement, raise self-esteem for African American
students, improve race relations, and produce other long-term benefits
for all students in desegregated schools.3"8 Yet some scholars have
concluded that these standard justifications for desegregation lack any
verifiable support.319 The evolution of racial integration and the
criticisms of the direction it has taken have been largely ignored by the
full inclusion advocates and the courts that have accepted their strikingly
similar justifications. Before careening toward full disability inclusion,
its advocates should pause and reconsider whether inclusion actually
advances the beneficial values it purports to advance for disabled
students and whether the cost to the important functions of the public
school is worth the benefit obtained. In this section, I begin this inquiry
by examining the premises that sustain the disability inclusion movement
suggests that many girls do better in single-sex schools, where they often attain higher levels of
academic performance and career aspirations than girls in coeducational settings).
316. See Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Saying Separate Is Equal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1995,
at 2.
317. Yarbrough, supra note 261, at 686 (citing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J 470,
479-80 (1976)); see also Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The
Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 813,
820-21 (1993) (explaining that need for alternative education of African Americans to improve
educational performance is embodied in concept of immersion schools); Gerald W. Heaney, Busing,
Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of Equal Opportunity, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 735, 811
(1985) (noting preferences of some black parents in St. Louis for improved schools over integrated
schools); Christopher Steskal, Creating Space for Racial Difference: The Case for African American
Schools, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 187 (1992); Paul M. Barrett, Busing Revisited: Court to Ponder
Issue of School Integration as Some Blacks Shift, Wall St. J., Oct 4, 1991, at Al (noting that African
American parents are more concerned with obtaining fair share of resources for neighborhood
schools than with having integrated schools); James Traub, Separate and Equal, Atlantic, Sept.
1991, at 24 (pointing out support of black parents for school placement plan that returned many
students to racially segregated schools based on improved achievement test scores); Larry Tye, U.S.
Sounds Retreat in School Integration, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1992, at I (noting increasing numbers of
segregated schools and support of black leaders for schools designed to meet needs of inner-city
black youth).
318. See David J. Armor, Forced Justice, School Desegregation and the Law 61 (1995).
319. Id. at 112. Armor asserts that gains made by black students are primarily attributable not to
desegregation, but to improved educational and economic status of black parents. See id. at 76-98.
He sets forth evidence that implies that desegregation may in fact lower black self esteem. Id at 101.
He also notes that studies on the effect of desegregation on race relations and on other long-term
benefits are inconclusive. Id. at 102-03, 107-08.
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through the prism of the racial integration model, a critical perspective
that adds rich insight to the disability inclusion issue.
Although, as discussed below, there are significant distinctions
between school segregation because of race and school segregation
because of disability, there are also undeniable similarities. Both African
American children and disabled children were excluded by law from
many public schools. 32 African American children were excluded by law
from white schools in some states because they were viewed as different
and inferior. Similarly, disabled children were also excluded from
educational opportunity because they were viewed as different and
inferior. The difference that excluded the African American child was the
color of his skin. The difference that excluded the disabled child was his
disability. In deciding that excluding African American children by law
was unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education underscored the importance of education. Education is "the
very foundation of good citizenship. 32' As a "principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment,"'3 the court understood that "education is necessary for
individuals to function in a democratic society."3' Thus, according to the
Court, educational opportunity "must be made available to all on equal
terms.
3 2 4
The Brown Court's emphasis on the importance of education explains
why disabled children should not be excluded from all educational
opportunities because of their disabilities, but it does not support
inclusion in the regular classroom for a disabled child if the disabled
child would achieve better elsewhere. Indeed, the opinion's emphasis on
the importance of education seems to point in the opposite direction.
Brown is limited to irrational line-drawing based on race. At least for
some mental and physical disabilities, there is a rational reason for
differential treatment.
The "difference" that is a result of some kinds of disability-while it
most certainly does not warrant excluding the child by law from all
320. Cf. Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Converson of Desegregation
Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits, 42 Emory L.J. 791, 793-98 (1993) (describing historical
debate over separate versus integrated education in African American commun ty).
321. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
322. Id.
323. Sage & Burello, supra note 20, at 39.
324. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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educational services-is a difference that may have at least some
relevance to academic achievement if the child were included in the
general education classroom."s With race there is no question of
degree-no child of whatever shade or hue should be excluded from a
classroom because of color, because color is not related to any relevant
educational consideration. But children have a wide range of disabilities;
where few would argue that a child missing a leg should be excluded
from the general education classroom because she is in a wheelchair, a
child with no brain stem who cannot walk, talk or control bodily
functions should be placed in a special segregated classroom.326 A child
with certain kinds of severe cognitive disabilities simply may not be able
to achieve academically in the regular classroom. Because of the varied
manifestations and limitations of the many cognitive, behavioral, and
physical disabilities that can affect a child, segregation by disability,
unlike by race, involves line drawing between those whose disability
allows them to be included in the regular classroom and those whose
disability is too severe for satisfactory inclusion. Indeed, some children
with severe cognitive disabilities may become defeated and frustrated if
they are placed in regular classrooms where they are unable to perform
with their nondisabled peers.327
Thus, although the result of racial and disability discrimination was
the same-outright exclusion from certain schools by law-this does not
necessarily mean that the remedy for the wrong-full inclusion-should
be the same in each and every disability case. It is true that the civil
rights issue for racial minorities and for disabled students is one of
access. But in the former case the issue is one of access to the same
services provided to others, regardless of skin color; in the latter case,
however, the issue is one of "access to a differentiated education
designed specifically to accommodate [the special needs of the disabled
325. See Kauffman, supra note 263, at 261-62. ("[T]he physical, cognitive and behavioral
characteristics of handicapped children and youth are more complex and relevant to learning and to
the function of schools... than is ethnic origin."); Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination
Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 429 (1984) (explaining how denial of
equal opportunity on basis of disability can be distinguished from denial of equal opportunity on
basis of race).
326. See Kauffman, supra note 263, at 262 ("[S]eparateness may be required for equality of
opportunity when separation is based on criteria directly related to teaching and learning."). The
child should, of course, be mainstreamed "to the maximum extent appropriate" for lunch, recess, art,
music, or physical education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
327. See National Sch. Pub. relations Ass'n, supra note 2, at 63-64; Kauffman & Pullen, supra
note 176, at 7-8.
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child] even if accommodation requires separation. '3 28 In addition, as
examined below, some commentators and judges have debated whether
the integration remedy, even as conceived for racial exclusion, has itself
exacerbated the "feelings of inferiority" that it was suppcsed to cure.329
Despite these differences between disability and racial segregation, the
full inclusion advocates have insinuated much of the analytical
framework used by the courts in the race cases into the disability
inclusion rhetoric.330 Full inclusionists argue that the stigma that results
from segregation either by race or by disability is an overarching evil-a
plague that only inclusion will cure.33 This cry for total inclusion has
emotional appeal and fosters the image of the full inclusion advocate as
taking the moral high ground.
As H.L. Mencken once said, "For every complex issue there is a
simple answer, and it is wrong."332 Inclusion for all disabled students is
viewed as the "simple answer"-the therapy necessary lo cure a serious
pathology-and, as such, it takes on a force of its own. In short,
inclusion must be achieved, even at great cost. It must subjugate other
values, even-in the case of the disabled child-the value of academic
training. Yet after considering the arguments of some of the critics of the
legal process of racial desegregation, it may well be that the path forged
in the racial integration movement would best be left untraveled by
children with disabilities.
The Brown Court established the premise that segregation inherently
constitutes nonequality, a premise that advocates of full inclusion use to
press their claim for including all students in general education
classrooms in their neighborhood schools.333 The Court described the
harm caused by de jure racial segregation in very much the way inclusion
advocates describe the harm caused by placing a disabled child in a
separate special education classroom: "To separate [these black students]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
328. Kauffian, supra note 263, at 262.
329. See Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 67; see also Brown-Scott, supra note
315, at 545 (pointing to possibility that integration itself caused stigma). Compare Brown-Scott's
critique of Brown with the critique of the article by Lloyd Dunn, see infra note 341.
330. See supra note 20.
331. Cf. Kauffman, supra note 263, at 261 (pointing out that inclusion advocates cited Brown and
"discredited doctrine of 'separate but equal' as justification for the integration of handicapped
students into regular classrooms").
332. Macmillan et a., supra note 102, at 477 (quoting Mencken).
333. See Sage & Burello, supra note 20, at 39; Kauffman & Pullen, supra nate 176, at 9.
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may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."334 Moreover, the Court stated:
Segregation of white and colored children in public school has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children.... [F]or the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children.
335
Ever since the Brown Court made this pronouncement, "[r]emedying
and avoiding the recurrence of this stigmatizing injury"--promoting
integration-have been the "guiding objectives of [the U.S. Supreme]
Court's desegregation jurisprudence."336
The Brown opinion entered American cultural consciousness as the
point at which the U.S. Supreme Court reached its most glorious
moment. But in recent years the Brown opinion and its school
desegregation progeny have come under increasing criticism by scholars
who claim that some of the premises that formed the basis of the racial
integration model harmed future generations of African American school
children.337 Much of the criticism of Brown and its progeny stems from
the stigma theory and the implicit claim--similar to the disability
inclusionists' claim-that African American students would obtain
significant educational benefits and would feel less inferior by sitting in
the same classroom with white children.338 The Brown Court's analysis
of the "intangibles" that were missing from the African American
segregated schools is the genesis of this criticism. Because the Brown
Court started with the assumption that the "Negro and white schools
involved had been equalized ... with respect to buildings, curricula,
334. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
335. Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Board ofEduc., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
336. Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,258 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
337. See, e.g., Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 67-80 (criticizing ideological
framework established by Brown and its progeny as replicating same disease they purported to cure);
Alex M. Johnson, Bid Whist, Tank and United States v. Fordice: Why Integradonism Fails African-
Americans Again, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1401, 1402 (1993) (stating that Brown was a mistake); Drew S.
Days 1H, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 53 (1992)
(asserting that growing number of African Americans are repudiating integrative ideal).
338. See, e.g., Brown, DeJure Segregation, supra note 207, at 67-68.
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qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible fa-tors,"'339 the
Court needed to identify an intangible harm resulting from segregation
that required a remedy. Like the full disability inclusion advocates, the
Court focused on the impact on the sensibilities of the exclded students.
The Court accepted the argument-based in part on certain social science
studies-that segregation by law created feelings of inferiority and low
self-esteem in African American children.34 Scholars have roundly
criticized the Brown Court for relying on these studies, because the
disturbing results of the tests in those studies were never traced precisely
to education segregation per se.34' Critics of the stigmatic injury theory
assert that it implicitly promoted the idea of black inferiority, 42 and
"[s]ocial scientists overwhelmingly reject [the] theory today." '343
The problem with the stigmatic injury theory may be its failure to
distinguish for future cases-like disability inclusion--the difference
339. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added). But see Brown, supra note 320, at 808 (explaining
that "equal" part of "separate but equal" was generally ignored and that in three of four state cases
before Court "the physical facilities and other tangible resources were not in fact equal").
340. See, e.g., Brown-Scott, supra note 315, at 542 (asserting that Brown Court's stigma theory
implied that "black children are inferior").
341. See, e.g., id. at 541-42 n.28 (citing recent studies that criticize studies presented to Brown
Court); Philip Elam, Response, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1949, 1955-56 (1987) (same); William E.
Cross, Jr., Shades of Black- Diversity in African-American Identity 115-17 (1991) (arguing that
psychologist confused racial group identity preference with self-esteem, assuming that racial group
preference would automatically correspond with self-esteem). The studies-introduced into evidence
in the trials leading to the U.S. Supreme Court appeal-showed that African American children
viewed themselves as inferior to white people. See Brown-Scott, supra note 315, at 542. These
studies bolstered the theory that state-sponsored separation stigmatized African American children,
impairing their self-esteem and their ability to learn. See id.; cf Kauffman, supra note 263, at 271
(pointing out that studies of social status of children with disabilities do not show that stigma and
isolation they feel is necessarily result of their being taught outside regular classroom).
Along a similar vein, scholars are now criticizing the so-called "efficacy studies" that Lloyd Dunn
relied on in his article that is said to have been the genesis of the inclusion movement. See, e.g.,
Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note 265, at 496 (explaining why studies were flawed). According to
Dunn, the studies consistently suggested that "retarded pupils make as much progress or more in the
regular grades as they do in special education .... Efficacy studies on special day classes for other
mildly handicapped children, including the emotionally handicapped, reveal the same results." Dunn,
supra note 95, at 8. Scholars now point out that "virtually all of these studies were flawed because
they did not include random assignment of students to classes." Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note
265, at 501. Researchers have difficulty dealing with the ethical and legal issues of random
placement because placement is supposed to be in the best interest of the child. Id. Thus, those
placed in special classes likely had "learning problems that were more severe and less tractable." Id.
In the rare studies using random assignment, "the results were, if anything, favorable toward the
efficacy of special classes." Id. (citing studies).
342. See Brown-Scott, supra note 315, at 541.
343. Id. at 541 n.28.
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between separation and the meaning behind the separation." De jure
segregation was wrong-not simply because African American children
were being educated in all-black schools, although that was a part of the
problem. It was wrong because the meaning behind that forced
segregation was the belief that African American children were inferior
and did not belong in a classroom with Caucasian children. It was wrong
because no child should be excluded by law from any public school
classroom because of skin color. Unless the separation and the meaning
behind that separation are analyzed separately, however, it can appear
that the stigma occurs because of the separation itself, that is, because
African American children were attending all-black schools.345
Critics of the racial integration model claim that its implicit
message-that going to an all-black school somehow stigmatized black
children-was "just as harmful to their self-esteem as the idea of forced
segregation." '346 Thus, Professor Kevin Brown claims that "[a]t the same
time that the country was dismantling de jure segregation and its
concomitant message of African American inferiority, it was also
constructing a policy of integration which carried its own message of
African American inferiority."347 He asserts that "[t]he very remedies that
were undertaken in an attempt to eliminate a belief in African-American
inferiority were also-like segregation that had preceded it-standing as
symbols for it."3"
344. See supra notes 203-64 and accompanying text.
345. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he District
Court misunderstood the meaning of Brown L Brown I did not say that 'racially isolated' schools
were inherently inferior, the harm that it identified was tied purely to de jure segregation, not de
facto segregation.").
346. Brown-Scott, supra note 315, at 545; cf. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct at 2061 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior.').
347. Brown, supra note 320, at 817.
348. Id. The theory that integration will raise self-esteem of African Americans echoes eerily with
the claims of the full inclusion advocates. But, instead of increasing self-esteem, "many studies
[have] found that desegregation actually had a negative impact on the self-esteem of African
American school children." Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 80; see also id. at 80
n.333 (citing studies and stating that "[n]one of the desegregation studies [that were reviewed] found
that desegregation had positive effects on [African American] self-esteem, but 25% found that
desegregation had negative effects"); cf. James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating
Equality in Higher Education, 43 Duke L.J. 1115, 1150 (1994) (claiming that stigma may not exist
for students in predominantly black colleges).
Furthermore, social scientists have never been able to establish that desegregation alone would
lead to significant increases in the educational achievement of African Americans. See Brown,
De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 59. As Professor Brown points out:
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The stigmatic injury theory is a part of the ideological foundation that
has supported the racial integration remedy,349 and the Supreme Court
has continued to accept it.35 Despite criticism of the theory, it has taken
on a power of its own, with a force field that has reached into the
disability arena. But the criticism of Professor Brown and others should
give pause to the full inclusion advocates. By failing to analyze
separately the meaning behind separation and by failing to acknowledge
that-unlike race-there may be legitimate pedagogical reasons for
placing a disabled child in a special class, the full inclusion advocates
have implied that there is something inferior about a classroom that
contains only disabled students. To avoid the inevitable stigma that taints
a "disabled-only" class, full inclusion advocates would include these
children with the nondisabled in the general education classroom. Full
inclusion advocates should consider whether, by enshrining the idea that
an all-disabled class somehow stigmatizes the disabled, their "cure" for
stigma-inclusion-has in reality injected more of the diSease.35'
In addition to curing the stigma that occurs from separation, there has
been some suggestion that the racial integration model will also give
African American students other students to model. For instance, the
Court in Milliken v. BradleyA52 ("Milliken If'), "in reference to the
African-American school children who would continue to attend
segregated schools, stated that '[c]hildren who have been...
[S]ocial scientists, taking their cue from the Supreme Court, have tried for years to establish that
desegregation alone would lead to significant increases in the educatial achievement of
African-Americans. These studies, however, have not been able to establish consistently
significant educational benefits for African-Americans derived from racial mixing alone.
Id. at 57-58; see also id. at 58-59 n.255 (citing major study finding African American students'
achievements did not rise in proportion to presence of white classmates); Chris Hansen, Are the
Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in School Desegregation, 42 Emory L.J. 863, 871 (1993)
(pointing to studies that question whether desegregation improves educationel services to minority
children).
Professor Brown has cautioned, "If desegregation does not succeed in significantly raising the
academic achievement of African Americans, then from the perspective of the academic function of
schools, its continued use as an appropriate remedy is open to serious question." Brown, De Jure
Segregation, supra note 207, at 59-60 n.256. Some commentators who criticize the belief that racial
integration is necessary for quality education argue that, to the extent that problems of low self-
esteem still exist, they could be addressed by building on an Afrocentric curriculum. See, e.g.,
Sonia R Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 Yale L.J. 1285, 1286-87 (1992).
349. Brown, DeJure Segregation, supra note 207, at 52-73.
350. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992) (stating stigmatic injury is one of present
harms of past dejure segregation).
35 1. See Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 67-68.
352. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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educationally and culturally set apart from the larger community will
inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct and attitudes reflecting their
cultural isolation...." 35 Twenty-three years earlier, the Brown Court
had observed that "[s]egregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has
a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a racial[ly] integrated school system."3 ' Critics have asserted that the
implicit message is that the confinement of African Americans to all-
African American settings necessarily has a negative impact upon their
development.355 This notion fueled the belief "that 'white' schools had
'better' students whose achievement-oriented, achievement-ready
backgrounds created a powerful environmental press for academic
attainment." '356 Thus-much like the modeling rationale that underlies the
inclusion movement-racial integration was viewed as a way to "provide
social modeling of higher aspirations, skills and motivation to minority
students whose segregated school environments produced a defeating
climate of failure and hopelessness."357 The "intimation that black
children can only achieve academically when educated with white
children '"358 reverberates with the assumption by full inclusion advocates
that disabled children can improve themselves-and work to "cure" their
disability-by modeling their nondisabled peers.359 This assumption
brushes aside themes of independence, pride, and competence 3' and fails
353. Brown, supra note 320, at 812 (quoting Milliken 1H, 433 U.S. at 287).
354. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
355. See Brown, supra note 320, at 812 ("IT]he Court views the harm of de jure segregation as
more than just stigmatic, but also as retarding the cognitive, psychological, and emotional
development of African-Americans."); see also Brown, De Jure Segregation, supra note 207, at 63
("The Court's reasoning rests upon the belief that racial isolation had damaged and would continue
to damage only African-American children.") (emphasis in original). Professor Brown also criticizes
the notion that racial isolation had damaged and would continue to damage only African American
children. Id. at 67; cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(asserting that Court majority reads Supreme Court cases to support theory that blacks suffer
unspecified psychological harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational
development, an approach that "rests on an assumption of black inferiority").
356. Melvin L Semmel et al., Twenty-Five Years After Dunn's Article: A Legacy of Policy
Analysis Research in Special Education, 27 J. Special Educ. 481, 485 (1994).
357. Id.
358. Yarbrough, supra note 261, at 691.
359. See Semmel et al., supra note 356, at 485 (acknowledging argument that "white' schools
had 'better' students" who would "provide social modeling of higher aspirations, skills, and
motivation to minority students").
360. See Brown, supra note 320, at 819; cf. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L..
758, 795 (claiming that integration caused blacks to lose "the ability to control and shape their
children's education").
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to recognize that close association among minority groups may actually
enhance self-esteem by promoting the "acceptance of group difference as
positive."361
Education reform movements-like the disability inclusion
movement-that have arisen in the wake of school desegregation have
been profoundly affected by the Court's jurisprudence. Some educators,
specifically inclusion advocates, have referred to language in Brown
when discussing the need for educational reform.362 This reliance on
Brown is not surprising. Certainly the "public discourse of judges is
given a preferred meaning and assumed to reflect accurately reality."363
Indeed, court opinions on racial desegregation operate "to validate
particular conceptions of society .... "' Yet by relying on Brown,
inclusion advocates have also imported into the disability area some of
the same troubling assumptions that critics claim have plagued racial
integration. By "[c]onfusing the social goal of equal opportunity with
place of opportunity,"365 they have distracted attention and effort from
the primary academic mission of the school. In so doing, inclusion
advocates have also failed to recognize "the complexity of achieving
equal educational opportunity for children to whom it so long has been
denied." '366 Those who would set inclusion as the primary goal for
disabled students-a goal that would supersede academic performance-
should carefully study the racial integration model and reconsider
whether they wish to follow that road to its ultimate destination.
In their concern over placement, stigma, and de facto segregation, the
full inclusionists ignore "the overriding fact" that many children have
"overwhelming learning problems" that will not simply disappear when
361. Brown-Scott, supra note 315, at 546 n.5; see also Johnson, supra note 337, at 1420 ("[Ihe
unique nomos of the African-American community is maintained, strengthened, and transmitted by
African-American educational institutions ... "); cf. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that historically black colleges can be source of pride and
source of hope).
362. See Brown, DeJure Segregation, supra note 207, at 74-75 n.309.
363. Id. at 73.
364. Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race
Relations, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 1043, 1050 (1988).
365. Semmel et al., supra note 356, at 485 (emphasis in original).
366. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 477-78 (1976); cf. Michae.l Rebell, Structural
Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 Geo. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1986) (claiming that
comparing disability discrimination to race discrimination often misleads court3).
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the children are included in the regular classroom communities.3 67
Children are seldom identified as candidates for placement in special
education classes before they enter school.3 6 Differences become
apparent as the disabled child fails to make expected progress in the
regular kindergarten or first grade classrooms.369 Indeed, the primary
reason that a child is referred for placement in special classes is the
failure of the child to learn in the regular class.37 ° Inclusion in that very
same regular classroom will hardly resolve the child's serious learning
problems-without a massive effort in additional individualized special
aids and services.371 I address the cost of such an effort to the community
of learning in the regular classroom in the next section.
367. Charles W. Telford & James M. Sawrey, Exceptional Individual 117 (3d ed. 1977). As
discussed above, many federal courts that have addressed the disability inclusion issue have failed to
consider carefully the extent to which inclusion affects the academic achievement of disabled
students. See supra Part ILD.1. Indeed, the standard set by many courts would require inclusion even
if inclusion would not significantly raise the academic achievement of the particular disabled student
in question and even if the child would achieve better academically in a special classroom
environment. As with racial integration, however, inclusion does not always result in satisfactory
academic achievement. Although research on academic achievement and inclusion is still in the early
stages, one recent study reported that only 54% of the included students with learning disabilities
had moved up in relative standing after one year in general education classrooms. See Naomi
Zigmond et al., When Students Fail to Achieve Satisfactorily: A Reply to McLesky and Waldron, 77
Phi Delta Kappan 303, 303 (1995). Another study reported that the students in question-students
with learning disabilities-progressed academically in special resource programs but did not
progress in the general classroom. See Douglas Fuchs & Lynn S. Fuchs, What's 'Special' About
Special Education?, 76 Phi Delta Kappan 522, 522-30 (1995). But see Dorothy K. Lipsky & Alan
Gartner, Common Questions About Inclusion, 25 Exceptional Parent, Sept. 1995, at 36 (stating that
although there are few full-scale evaluations of inclusive education outcomes, some studies show
more behavioral progress and increased social competence but limited difference in academic
performance for students with mild and moderate disabilities).
368. Telford & Sawrey, supra note 367, at 117.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 117-18 (stating that in only "most flagrant" case would child who is successful
educationally be referred and inappropriately placed in special class); see also MacMillan et al.,
supra note 102, at 472 (explaining that referral for special education by general classroom teacher is
"based on the teacher's perceptions that a child deviated markedly from classmates in achievement
and social/personal adjustment and on the premise that the teacher had tried but failed to minimize
the observed deficit").
371. See MacMillan et al., supra note 102, at 472 (explaining that it is difficult to argue that child
referred for special class because of severe problems in general classroom "would be successful in
regular education with no ancillary support").
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V. THE COMMUNITY OF LEARNING AND THE COST OF
INCLUSION
The public school classroom consists of a community where students
perform within a group that is propelled forward in academic
competency. When the academic function of public school education is
neglected, the school as a community of learning and the students within
it suffer. The full inclusion advocates, in their zeal to elevate placement
over academic achievement, seem uninterested ia a searching
examination of the extent to which academic achievement is a function
of the classroom as a community. But, as any teacher knows, the success
of a lesson and the progress of individual students in he classroom is
often a function of the personality of the class and the community of
learning that exists in that particular classroom.372
Professor Suzanna Sherry has pointed out that education is not
something that is "merely provided by the government and consumed by
the individual."373 Rather, it is "an ongoing lesson in responsible
citizenship that requires participation and dedication on the part of
present and future citizens."374 That participation and dedication takes
place in the classroom community. The full inclusion advocates and the
courts that have implicitly accepted their assumptions, however, give too
little weight to some ingredients that are vital to the creation of a
community of learning where all students can participate in the ongoing
lesson of responsible citizenship.
In a typical general education classroom there are: approximately
twenty-five to thirty students, each of whom should be given the
opportunity to achieve academically at their greatest potential. No two
students are exactly alike; each has individual strengths and weaknesses.
In an ideal world, each student would be given one-on-one instruction
tailored specifically to his or her needs. 37 Because of limited time and
resources, however, this kind of individual attention is not possible in the
regular classroom, so the instructor must teach groups3 of students-
sometimes the entire group, sometimes smaller groups--at the level at
which they are most likely to progress to reach their full academic
372. See, e.g., Semmel et al., supra note 356, at 491 (defining classroom as part of "complex
organization of people and activity that manifests itself as a particular culture, climate and
environment").
373. Sherry, supra note 28, at 133.
374. Id.
375. Ironically, this is precisely what many disabled students receive when they are educated in a
segregated classroom.
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potential. This is not an easy task. It requires, at a minimum, an
assessment of the ability level of the group: Is the group ready for the
next step in the learning process? How big or how small a step is the
group ready for? Good instruction requires careful lesson planning that
addresses how best to transfer knowledge to that particular group. It
requires creating and gathering the materials to be used in teaching the
lesson. A well-taught lesson requires the energy, enthusiasm, and
patience of the teacher and the attention, reflection, and concentration of
the students. It further requires assessment by both teacher and students
to ascertain if the knowledge has been transferred to the students. It is not
easy to establish a community of learning in which all of these elements
work well together.17
6
Unfortunately, many general education classrooms in the public
schools are not working well, even for nondisabled students. The
problems of society-broken families, drugs, violence-often follow
children from the streets to the classrooms and infect the community of
learning. Overburdened teachers struggle to educate children as they take
on more and more of the responsibilities that traditionally have been the
concern of other institutions-family, church, and community.37 7 Full
inclusionists apparently believe that, despite these problems, the general
education classroom will respond to full inclusion by improving
dramatically so as to accommodate an increased number of disabled
students. In the next section I explain how general education classrooms
have been asked to respond to inclusion, and I analyze the effect of
inclusion on the community of learning in the regular classroom.
A. The Effect on the Academic Achievement of Nondisabled Students
IDEA requires that removal of children with disabilities from the
regular education environment occurs "only when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.""37
376. See generally Richard A. Weatherly, Reforming Special Education: Policy Implementation
from State Level to Street Level 73 (1979) (explaining difficulties inherent in educating large
numbers of children and attending to each child's individual needs).
377. See, e.g., Judith H. Cohen, What Is a Teacher's Job?: An Examination of the Social and
Legal Causes of Role Expansion andIts Consequences, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 427,427 (1991)
(noting how school services have taken on expanded dimensions where family or community have
failed to do so). The passage of IDEA significantly increased the number of children placed in
regular classrooms, requiring teachers to serve a much broader range of students with diverse
educational and psychological needs. Id. at 433.
378. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
Washington Law Review
The question then becomes at what point is the school allowed to say that
education in the regular classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily so that
the disabled child must be placed in a special education classroom. There
are several reasons why education in a regular classroom may not be
achieved satisfactorily. In Part IV, this Article addressed one of these
reasons-the child may simply obtain greater academic benefit in a
special education classroom. But even if the disabled child will obtain
greater academic benefit in the regular classroom, education cannot be
achieved satisfactorily for other students in the regular classroom if the
child interferes with the learning of others in the classroom community.
A disabled child may interfere with the learning of others by disrupting
the classroom activities or because the child requires a disproportionate
amount of the teacher's time and energy.379
The statutory language of IDEA fully contemplates that inclusion will
not always work because sometimes "education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily" '38 for either the disabled child or for Ihe nondisabled
children in the regular classroom. The statute does not say that removal
can occur only when education in the regular classroom is not achieved
satisfactorily for the disabled child. A fair reading of the statute provides
for removing a disabled child from the regular classroom if the education
of the children in the classroom (which includes nondisabled children)
cannot be achieved satisfactorily for the children in the classroom (which
again includes nondisabled children). Yet, in part because of an
explanatory note to a regulation promulgated under IDEA.351'-a note that
is based on yet another explanatory note that is, in turn, based on another
statute3 2-- many courts considering inclusion have failed to give enough
weight to the cost to the learning community.
379. A synthesis of numerous surveys of teachers-many of which were conducted long before
the call for full inclusion-reports that while most agreed with the general concept of
mainstreaming/inclusion, "[a] substantial minority believed that students with disabilities would be
disruptive to their classes or demand too much attention." Thomas E. Scrggs & MargoA.
Mastropieri, Teacher Perceptions of MainstreaminglInclusion, 1958-1995: A Research Synthesis,
63 Exceptional Children 59, 63 (1996). "Teachers are more willing to include students with mild
disabilities than students with more severe disabilities, apparently because of teachers' perceived
ability to carry on their teaching mission for the entire classroom." Id. at 64. Oily about "one fourth
to one third of teachers surveyed agreed they had sufficient time, training, or material/personnel
resources to implement mainstreaming/inclusion successfully." Id. at 63.
380. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
381. See 34 C.F.1L § 300.552 note (1996).
382. See 34 C.F.R pt. 104 app. A., subpt. D, para. 24 (1996) (analyzing final regulation promul-
gated under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
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1. Disruption
The comments to the regulations promulgated pursuant to IDEA state
that "[i]n selecting the [least restrictive environment], consideration is
given to any potential harmful effect on the child [with a disability] or on
the quality of services that he or she needs.""3 3 As explained above, the
statutory language is not so narrow, and it fairly contemplates the effect
the placement will have on the education of all students. The explanatory
notes after the IDEA regulation state, "The analysis of the regulations for
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... includes several points
regarding educational placements of children with disabilities that are
pertinent to this section."3 4 Yet Section 504385 does not contain statutory
language identical to IDEA regarding the circumstances under which
removal from the regular classroom would be permissible, although the
regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act set forth similar
language." 6 Thus, it is unclear why regulations analyzing Section 504
have any particular relevance for IDEA. Nevertheless, the IDEA
regulation explanatory note states, "where a handicapped child is so
disruptive in a regular classroom that the education of other students is
significantly impaired, the needs of the handicapped child cannot be met
in that environment. Therefore regular placement would not be
appropriate to his or her needs. 387
Although the explanatory note seems at first blush to consider the
community of learning in the classroom, a close examination reveals that
it is actually directed at the needs of the disabled child. Rather than
focusing on the needs of all the children in the classroom, the
explanatory note focuses on whether the "needs" of the disabled child are
383. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(d).
384. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
385. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 504 provides, "No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
386. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (1996). The regulation states:
A recipient to which this subpart applies shall educate, or shall provide for the education of,
each qualified handicapped person in its jurisdiction with persons who are not handicapped to
the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person. A recipient shall place
a handicapped person in the regular educational environment operated by the recipient unless it
is demonstrated by the recipient that the education of the person in the regular environment with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
34 C.F.R. § 104.34.
387. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
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being met when the disabled child is disruptive."' Although the statute
does not require such a narrow reading, according to this explanatory
note and the cases that have cited it,389 until the education of the other
students in the classroom is significantly impaired, inclusion is
warranted. Inclusion is warranted because-until that point-the
disabled child, despite being disruptive, may still be benefiting in some
way from inclusion. Once the disabled child gets too disruptive, though,
his needs cannot be met in the regular classroom and he should be placed
in an environment where his needs can be better served.39°
This explanatory note to the regulation would allow ae claimed-yet
untested-benefits of inclusion for one disruptive disabled child to harm
the education of every child in the classroom. It demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of the working of the classroom as a
community. Significant impairment is impairment "having or likely to
have a major effect" or impairment that is "fairly large in amount or
quantity."39' Under this standard then, disruption that has a moderate
effect or an effect that is only somewhat large ia amount may
nonetheless warrant inclusion. A substantial amount of learning is lost by
many students before disruption becomes so severe their education is
significantly impaired.392 Students (these students may comprise other
disabled children who are included but are not disruptive) should not be
forced to endure this degree of impairment to their education merely to
elevate the concept of inclusion. And it is not clear bow many other
students must thus be affected for the presumption of inclusion to be
overcome. Note that the standard is set forth in the plural: it speaks to the
impairment of the "other students."'393 This raises a variety of questions.
If the education of one student is significantly impaired, is that enough
impairment for the disruptive student to be excluded? What if a
reasonable "other student" would not have been significantly impaired,
but this one particular student was so impaired?
388. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
389. See, e.g., Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel R.R. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1989).
390. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[I]f a child is causing
excessive disruption of the class, the child may not be benefiting educationally in that
environment").
391. American Heritage College Dictionary 1268 (3d ed. 1993).
392. Some inclusion advocates would disregard even significant impairment for nondisabled
students. See Kotler, supra note 37, at 381 ("If a normal child has the occasional misfortune to be
assigned an incompetent teacher for a year, typically the harm caused can be corrected later through
a formal or informal remedial process.").
393. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
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Moreover, establishing "significant" disruption as the only type of
behavior that is important enough to affect the classroom community of
learning ignores the fact that harm to the educational process takes many
shapes. A palpable disturbance is not the only way to affect the learning
of other students.3" Even a low or moderate level of distraction that does
not reach the level of disruption can harm the educational progress of the
classroom community. "[C]hildren are easily diverted from their studies
and indeed often welcome the smallest distraction as an excuse to attend
to something other than the task at hand."395 One child's distracting
behavior can affect the teacher's ability to teach the class by interrupting
both the teacher's and the other students' trains of thought. Restarting
lessons after dealing with problems presented by one child may deprive
all the children of valuable instruction time. "Obtaining a 'serious
education' ... is not easy.... [I]t most often involves hard work,
concentration and constraints-discipline of self and discipline of
others .... ,396 Distraction and breaks in concentration for individual
students, as well as distraction and breaks in self-discipline within the
classroom community, make it more difficult to create an environment
where serious learning can and will take place.
Even with "disruption" and "significant impairment" as the standard,
courts are ill-suited-as opposed to the child's IEP team or an
administrative hearing officer-to determine how a disruption affects the
learning in the classroom community.3 97 The kind of disruption that will
significantly impair the learning in a particular classroom community
will vary from school to school and from class to class.3 98
The flawed explanatory note to a regulation promulgated under IDEA
need not and should not drive the inclusion inquiry. This explanatory
note merely addresses one scenario-when the disabled child is
disruptive-where the educational needs of the handicapped child cannot
394. See Dupre, supra note 25, at 98.
395. Id. at 99.
396. Id. at 98.
397. See Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989).
398. See Dupre, supra note 25, at 99; Semmel et al., supra note 356, at 494 (noting that school
environments vary "greatly with respect to their potential to accommodate individual differences");
cf. Lipsky & Gartner, supra note 367, at 37 (citing to study that showed no difference between
inclusive and noninclusive classrooms in terms of instructional time lost to interruptions). Of course,
this determination is a function of the classes studied. The kindergarten class in which Raphael
Oberti was included must certainly have lost considerable instructional time due to Raphael's
"repeated toilet accidents, temper tantrums, crawling and hiding under furniture, and touching,
hitting and spitting on other children" and striking at and hitting the teacher and teacher's aide. See
Oberti v. Board ofEduc., 995 F.2d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993).
Washington Law Review
be met satisfactorily in the regular classroom. It does not even purport to
address all the scenarios where the needs of the disabled child cannot be
met in the regular classroom. Most importantly, it does not purport to
address any of the circumstances under which education cannot be
achieved satisfactorily because the needs of the nondisabled children
cannot be met. The explanatory note's failure to discuss other
circumstances where education may not be achieved satisfactorily does
not preclude a court from doing so. The language in the explanatory note
does not indicate that it sets forth an exclusive list of circumstances
where placement in a regular classroom would be improper. Rather, the
note explicitly states that the analysis is merely "several points regarding
educational placement of children with disabilities that are pertinent to
this section." '399 Because the statute itself allows courts to consider
whether education in the regular classroom can be achieved satisfactorily
for all students, the language in the explanatory note should be not bar a
court from making this assessment. In consequence, courts should not
hesitate to assess the effect inclusion has on the community of learning
and need not make this determination based only on "disruption" that
results in "significant impairment." '
2. Teacher Attention
Some courts of appeals have recognized that disruption is not the only
scenario where education in regular classes cannot be achieved
satisfactorily. These courts have acknowledged that a disabled student
who may not be disruptive may nonetheless require more of a teacher's
time than other students.4"' A disabled child will often require an
individualized lesson plan, individualized materials, a modified teaching
style, extra time, individual attention during the lesson itself, and an
individualized testing procedure. 2 Increasing the demands on a
399. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note (1996).
400. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 note.
401. See, e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
disabled child "may require so much of the instructor's attention that the instructor will have to
ignore the other student's needs in order to tend to the handicapped child"); Board of Educ. v.
Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that disabled child "'may be disruptive or
may unreasonably occupy the teacher's time to the detriment of other students"), aff'd sub nom.
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
402. See Thomas E. Scruggs & Margo A. Mastropieri, What Makes Special Education Special?
Evaluating Inclusion Programs with the Pass Variables, 29 J. Special Educ. 224, 226-27 (1995)
(noting that teachers must adapt materials, instructional strategies, and instructional environments to
meet needs of disabled students); Baker & Zigmond, supra note 18, at 173 (noting time required to
make accommodations for learning disabled student who needed "constant one-on-one guidance");
Vol. 72:775, 1997
Disability and the Public Schools
teacher's time can decrease the quality of education for all students.4 3
Moreover, "these different activities and materials tend to separate
students with and without disabilities, reducing the amount and quality of
social interaction between them."4' The question then becomes when the
amount of time a teacher spends attending to a disabled child is so
disproportionate to the time spent on other children that it will lead to a
determination that education in the regular classroom cannot be achieved
satisfactorily. Again, perhaps because of the influence of the explanatory
note discussed above, the standard set by some federal courts of appeals
gives insufficient consideration to the needs of the classroom community
and too much consideration to the needs of the individual disabled
student.
The teacher is the catalyst who ensures that learning takes place in the
classroom community. The teacher-among many other duties-assesses
the needs of the students in the class, plans the lessons, instructs the
students, answers questions, reinforces concepts, and corrects mistakes.
The teacher also must accomplish all the tasks that go along with
instruction while supervising the students prudently.4 5
The courts have acknowledged that regular classroom teachers "must
devote extra attention to their handicapped students."4 6 But despite the
importance of teacher time and attention to the learning process, some
Douglas Fuchs & Lynn Fuchs, Inclusive Schools Movement and the Radicalization of Special
Education Reform, 60 Exceptional Children 294, 302 (1994) (pointing out "that teachers attempting
to accommodate a wide diversity of students must orchestrate a greater number of activities and
materials, substantially complicating their job").
403. See William E. Davis, The Regular Education Initiative Debate: Its Promises and Problems,
55 Exceptional Children 440, 442 (1989) (explaining teacher frustration with "excellence versus
equity trap" where there is increased "public pressure [for teachers], to improve the overall academic
performance levels of their students" while they must also "attempt to 'accommodate' difficult-to-
teach students within their classes-which may result in the overall decrease of student achievement
scores"),
404. Fuchs & Fuchs, supra note 402, at 302.
405. See, e.g., Payne v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 382 S.E.2d 449,451 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that standard of care for teachers is what person of ordinary prudence charged
with teacher's duties would exercise in same circumstances).
406. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1051. But see Lipsky & Gartner, supra note 367, at 37 (citing to
study that showed that even presence of students with severe disabilities had "no effect" on the
amount of teacher attention received by students without disabilities). As the Daniel R.R. court and
other courts have recognized, it is hard to comprehend how a teacher attempting to meet the unique
needs of students with severe disabilities-for instance, students with severe behavioral problems
who require individualized lesson plans, individualized materials, a modified teaching style, extra
attention during lessons, and individualized testing-could meet the disabled child's IEP objectives
without having some effect on the amount of teacher attention received by students without
disabilities.
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courts have intimated that a disabled student who takes up large amounts
of teacher time and attention must nevertheless be included in the general
education classroom. Although these courts have conceded that there is
some point where a disabled student may demand too much from the
teacher to the detriment of other children in the class, they have failed to
set a workable standard. According to one court, the regular classroom
teachers are not required to devote "all or most of their time to one
handicapped child."'t47 After all, the teacher who focuses on one child
affects the achievement of the whole class, which may include "equally
deserving handicapped children who also may require extra attention."4 8
Another court has asserted that only when a disabled child requires so
much of the teacher's attention that the teacher will be required to
"ignore the other students" can the amount of teacher time and attention
spent with a disabled child even be considered as a factor that could (it
may not necessarily do so) overcome the presumption for inclusion."
Yet another court mixed the disruption factor and the teacher attention
factor together, stating that "[a] handicapped child who merely requires
more teacher attention than most other children is not likely to be so
disruptive as to significantly impair the education of other children."'"0
Of course, a nondisruptive child who "merely" requires more attention
could impair the education of other children, if the teacher focuses
primarily on that child instead of teaching the rest of the class.
One subset of the teacher time and attention factor is the extent to
which the teacher must modify the curriculum that is being taught to the
rest of the class to accommodate the disabled student. Again, although
some courts have acknowledged that there is a point where the
modification required to accommodate a disabled student may be too
great, they have failed to set a workable standard in this area as well.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the regular classroom teacher is not
required "to modify the regular education curriculum to the extent that
the handicapped child is not required to learn any of the skills normally
taught in regular education."'" Another court observed-without
407. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
408. Id. at 1049. Of course, although the court fails to say so, nondisabled'children may also be
deserving of and, depending on the lesson, may also require extra attention.
409. Oberti v. Board of Educ. 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1993).
410. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991).
411. DanielR.R, 874 F.2d at 1049 (emphasis added).
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irony-that teaching two separate classes (the lesson for the regular class
and the lesson for the disabled student) "could prove impossible."'"2
Although teachers need not "modify the regular education program
beyond recognition," 4"3 as with the disruption factor, a teacher may
spend a great amount of time and energy with a disabled student before
the teacher reaches the point where the teacher ignores the needs of other
students or modifies the regular education program beyond recognition.
Teaching a student with special needs requires evaluating the curriculum
and giving the highest priority to the skills that are most important to the
disabled student.4 4 For instance, a teacher instructing a class on the use
of a microscope will need to adapt the lesson for a disabled student with
poorly developed fine motor skills who is attempting to collect and stain
specimens, prepare them for mounting, and adjust the microscope. If the
disabled student has poor organizational skills, the child will need an
adaption for working through the collection, staining, and mounting
process. If the science unit contains difficult vocabulary words that are
critical to understanding the lesson, a disabled child who has trouble
remembering will require special materials.4 5
The teacher may simply have to make compromises that affect the
other students when presenting the lesson. A teacher may shorten a
complicated lesson because time is required elsewhere to meet needs of a
disabled child who is learning at a different level or with different
materials. Because of time constraints, a teacher who must spend extra
time individually with a disabled child to ensure that the child's needs
are met may find it necessary to assign workbook problems to the
students, rather than go over the analytical process with them. A teacher
who must use classroom time attending to the special needs of the
disabled child may lack the extra time at the end of a unit to try an
enrichment lesson that may not be a required skill, but that may
nonetheless add to the educational capital of the students. In these
scenarios the teacher is not ignoring the needs of other students. Nor is it
possible to measure precisely how much learning is lost each time the
teacher's attention is directed elsewhere. Yet even if the teacher has not
reached the point where the teacher is "ignoring" the needs of other
students or spending "most" of the lesson time with one child, enough
412 Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 880 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom.
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
413. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
414. Scruggs & Mastropieri, supra note 402, at 225.
415. Id.
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learning may be lost cumulatively over time such that the educational
progress of many students in the learning community is harmed. The
teacher attention factor should be weighed more heavily toward the
progress of the learning community as a whole. If the needs of the
disabled student are such that the time a teacher must devote to fulfilling
those needs interferes with the academic progress of other students in the
community of learning, "education" is not being achieved
"satisfactorily" and inclusion in the regular classroom cannot be an
"appropriate" placement.416
One additional aspect of the disruption and teacher attention factors
that the courts have failed to consider adequately is the effect on teacher
stress levels when the teacher is torn in many different directions while
attempting to instruct students.417 The inclusion of children with
disabilities in the general education classroom increases the variance in
student abilities with correlative in instructional demands. 4 ' All teachers
vary in their ability to plan instruction that is suitable to the individual
differences exhibited by learners and apply their motivalion, knowledge,
skills and experience in complex ways. 419 "With the increased numbers
of high-need, developmentally unfinished children in regular classes
today, many teachers find themselves fatigued to the point of zombie-
like responses." '42 Constant distraction and concern over the needs of a
disabled child may deplete the energy and enthusiasm levels of even the
most dedicated teacher.4 Planning and implementing a creative,
416. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994). Of course, under the statute, due consideration must be
given as to whether supplementary aids and services provided to the disablecL child would alleviate
the problem. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
417. "The demands placed on teachers today are overwhelming. Not only are they being asked to
do more than ever with regard to curriculum content, but they are faced with more and more students
who are not identified for special education but who have a host of problems." Hallahan &
Kauffman, supra note 267, at 499. Moreover, increases in poverty, drug abuse and family instability
have led to more children at risk for both physical and psychosocial disabilities. See id. at 498-99.
One teacher discussing her problems dealing with a child with an emotional disability stated, "He
would bite other students and blow in their faces. He wouldn't stay in one place for a minute. I spent
the entire year worrying that he would seriously injure another student." Webb, supra note 173, at 2.
418. Hallahan & Kauffman, supra note 267, at 498.
419. See Semmel et al., supra note 356, at 490.
420. William C. Morse, Comments From a Biased Viewpoint, 27 J. Special Educ. 531, 539
(1994).
421. See, e.g., John Leo, Mainstreaming's 'Jimmy Problem,'U.S. News & World Rep., June 27,
1994, at 22 (describing case where, after school district lost court battle for special education
placement for child who threw chairs, toppled desks, and bit and kicked other children and teachers,
teacher went on medical leave because of stress, and 12 of 31 children in class were removed by
their parents).
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challenging, and useful lesson is demanding work in and of itself. A
teacher who foresees spending a significant amount of time modifying a
lesson for a disabled child may lose the motivation to plan a complex
lesson, or simply may become too tired to do so. In short, working to
implement an IEP without letting the time and attention needed to do so
interfere with the education of others may have a long term effect on
teacher stress levels.
The upshot of full inclusion will sometimes lead to classrooms where
the teacher must address the needs of several disabled students. The
American Federation of Teachers has cited instances where teachers
were responsible for classrooms with as many as sixteen disabled
children.4" One way to deal with the needs of disabled children in the
general education classroom is to use a classroom model where teacher
aides or other students are primarily responsible for teaching the disabled
students. This model has been endorsed by some courts that have
addressed what supplementary aids and services must be provided to a
disabled child who is included in the regular classroom.4' This model,
however, presents some knotty questions regarding whether the included
child is receiving an "appropriate education.""24 One study of numerous
inclusion sites determined that instructional aides assumed significant
responsibility for "teaching, monitoring and adapting instruction for
students with learning disabilities."'  In addition, a "study buddy"
classmate often had responsibility for accommodating the individual
needs of the learning disabled student.426 The researchers observed that
this model raised some concerns, specifically the lack of training of the
persons working with the disabled student and the informal nature of the
assistance that was merely reacting to an immediate need of the disabled
student.427 In short, the least well trained individuals were teaching the
most difficult to teach.428 Moreover, although there may be some benefit
422. Webb, supra note 173, at 2. One class with 36 students included 16 with disabilities. Id.
Another with 40 students included 10 with disabilities. Id.
423. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("A teacher's
aide can minimize the burden on the teacher if the handicapped child is not disruptive but needs
special assistance."), aff'd sub nom. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398
(9th Cir. 1994).
424. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994) (requiring that states assure disabled children right to
appropriate education).
425. Baker & Zigmond, supra note 18, at 177.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
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to a study buddy who teaches a disabled student, the study buddy may
forego valuable learning time acting as a peer teacher.429
B. Supplementary Aids and Services
Even if a disabled child is so disruptive that he or she significantly
impairs the education of others or demands most or all of a teacher's
attention, courts may nevertheless require inclusion. The full inclusion
advocates-with support from some courts-claim that a disabled child
who interferes with the learning of others merely needs additional aids
and services to be able to be educated satisfactorily in the regular
classroom.43 To be sure, IDEA states that removal from the regular
classroom should occur "only when the nature or severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. '431 To
interpret this provision, the courts have undertaken a complex inquiry:
how many aids and services must the school provide to accommodate the
disabled child in the regular classroom? Although the Fifth Circuit has
implied that the requirement may have some limit and that the school
need not provide so many aids and services that the classroom learning
community is turned into a special education classroom within a regular
classroom,432 the Third Circuit has suggested that the obligation to
provide aids and services is expansive.433 According to the Third Circuit,
IDEA "require[s] schools to provide supplementary aids and services to
enable children with disabilities to learn whenever possible in a regular
classroom. 434 Keeping this obligation in mind, the school must consider
whether an "adequate individualized program" with the necessary aids
and services would prevent any negative effect on other children in the
class.4
35
429. In addition, researchers have cautioned against placing nondisabled peers in the role of peer-
tutor because they "suspect that the status inequality inherent in the teacher-student relationship
mitigates against the possibility of friendly relations developing between disabled and nondisabled
students." Murray-Seegert, supra note 39, at 33.
430. But see Shanker, supra note 14, at 39 (stating that those who argue that necessary supports
will follow disabled children into regular classrooms should consider how the mentally ill were left
without promised support when they were de-institutionalized).
431. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994).
432. See Daniel R.R. v. State BdM of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989).
433. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993).
434. Id. at 1216. But see Daniel RR., 874 F.2d at 1048 ("States need not provide every
conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the child.").
435. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217.
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The Third Circuit addressed this issue in the context of a dispute over
the placement of a boy with Down's Syndrome who had "serious
behavioral problems" in a developmental kindergarten class.436 These
problems included repeated toilet accidents, temper tantrums, crawling
and hiding under furniture, touching and hitting and spitting on other
children, and hitting the teacher and teacher's aide on several
occasions.4" The district court determined (and the court of appeals
agreed) that these behavioral problems were a result of "an inadequate
level of services" provided in the classroom.438 Suggestions for the aids
and services that the school must provide to prevent this one child from
disrupting a regular classroom included: "the assistance of an itinerant
instructor with special education training, special education training for
the regular teacher, modification of... the academic curriculum,...
parallel instruction to allow [the child] to learn at his academic level, and
the use of a resource room ' "or any other available aids or services
appropriate to the child's particular disabilities." 0
Even if all these aids and services somehow manage to change the
severe behavioral problems exhibited by this one disabled child-in
addition to the potential effect all the aids and services may have on the
academic achievement of other children in the classroom41--one further
limit on the obligation to provide the additional aids and services
necessary to include a disabled child must be financial resources." 2
436. Id. at 1207-08.
437. Id. at 1208.
438. Id. at 1222 (quoting Oberti v. Board of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1403 (D.N..T. 1992)).
439. Id.; see also Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that school
district did not provide adequate specialized education training to child's regular teacher and aide).
In Mavis, the court determined that a child should be included in a regular classroom, despite
evidence of behavioral problems and acting out, which was described in part as "striking students
and jabbing students with sharp pencils." Id. at 991. The court stated, "It may well be that with
adequate supplemental aids and services Emily would be less fiustrated in a regular
classroom... and, hene ... would 'act out' less." Id.
440. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis added). In Department ofEducation v. Katherine D., 727
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983), the court addressed the placement of a child who required school personnel
to suction mucus from her tracheostomy tube and perform other health services. The court disagreed
with the Department of Education's claim that the child's disability was so severe that "education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services [could not] be achieved
satisfactorily." Id. at 815; see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding
that school nurse must be provided for eight-year-old who was unable voluntarily to empty her
bladder and needed to be catheterized every three to four hours).
441. See supra notes 394-429 and accompanying text.
442. See Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the
Handicapped Child, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1985, at 7, 7-8 ("A school district may
understand that certain services sought by parents on behalf of a handicapped child would be
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Although it is possible that school districts may use inclusion to avoid
the cost of separate education classrooms, some researchers have
concluded that implementing inclusion requires more resources than
special pull-out programs. 3
The courts have generally refused to consider financial cost if the
parties fail to raise the issue.4" But Congress realized that the availability
of resources for special services was a necessary limitation. IDEA
specifically provides that local school districts must provide special
services to enable disabled children to participate in regular educational
programs to the maximum extent practicable.5
Many of the courts that have considered cost have failed to interpret
this language as a meaningful constraint on inclusion. The Sixth Circuit,
for example, has looked at cost only from the perspective of the effect
excessive cost may have on other disabled children because "excessive
spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped
children." 6 The statute does not require such a na.row view, and
schools would be forced to abandon their academic mission if this
interpretation were followed to its logical conclusion. Tae public school
educational enterprise is for all students, and the "excessive" spending on
one group-whether it be the football team or the debate club-has the
potential to deprive other children of educational opportunity.
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a somewhat broader view: "If the cost
of educating a handicapped child in a regular classroom :xs so great that it
would significantly impact upon the education of other children in the
district, then education in a regular classroom is not appropriate." 7 At
the upper limit of the cost analysis, the court stated that "a school district
cannot be required to provide a handicapped child with his or her own
full-time teacher, even if this would permit the child to be satisfactorily
educated in a regular classroom." 8 But the court's balancing test does
not take into account the full impact on a school system when it must
provide the necessary aids and services to include many disabled
children throughout an entire district. The court required the school to
extremely beneficial to the child, but nevertheless be concerned about the re.ource implications of
those services.").
443. See, e.g., Baker & Zigmond, supra note 18, at 177.
444. See, e.g., Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218 n.25; Daniel tLR. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036,
1049 n.9 (5th Cir. 1989).
445. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(1)(C)(iv) (1994).
446. Ronckerv. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
447. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (1 Ith Cir. 1991).
448. Id.
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"balance the needs of each handicapped child against the needs of other
children in the district."4 9 For example, the court apparently would
assess the cost of providing the wide array of aids and services necessary
to include a child like Raphael Oberti and consider the effect that cost
has on the needs of the other children in the district. The cost for aids and
services necessary to include one child may not always have a significant
impact on the education of the other children in the district. But the
aggregate cost of the aids and services necessary to include all the
disabled children in the district with severe behavior problems may have
such a impact. The failure to consider the aggregate cost of aids and
services thus may allow a disproportionate amount of financial resources
to be used to underwrite inclusion.450
Thus, many of the important issues on the cost side of the disability
fulcrum still await recognition and illumination. The failure to clarify the
possible cost of full inclusion to the learning environment on other
students and the teacher ignores some of the most important components
of the community of learning. The failure to articulate when providing
aids and services to place the disabled child in the general education
classroom may prove excessive leaves the school with no guidance
regarding how it should allocate scarce resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts have wrestled to come to grips with the balance Congress
required between "free appropriate public educationet'5 for disabled
children and integration in the general classroom "to the maximum
extent appropriate.,452 The federal courts of appeals have reached
differing conclusions regarding how that balance should best be
achieved. To varying degrees, many courts have announced standards for
inclusion that have supplanted the academic value of education with the
value of integration. With dubious support, these courts have implied
that the costs of full inclusion would seldom outweigh its benefits. Of
course, there are substantial educational benefits from inclusion for many
children. Given the uncertainty of these benefits in many other cases,
however, courts must reconsider their uncritical acceptance of the
449. Id.
450. See Neal & Kirp, supra note 73, at 359 (expressing concern that IDEA may distort allocation
of limited school district resources and pointing out how legal model therein treats parties to dispute
as discreet from system in which they are located).
451. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
452. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (emphasis added).
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premises underlying the full inclusion movement. Courts can-under the
terms of the statute as written-once again elevate academic
achievement over academic setting, and they should do so explicitly and
without hesitation. The failure to allow the public school to fulfill its
mission as a community of learning, a community in which the primary
objective is to impart a serious education to all students, disserves the
students-both disabled and nondisabled-who have pI.aced their faith
and their future in this institution.
